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THE ROLE OF THE OBJECTOR AND THE
CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT CONFUSION
REGARDING FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 23.1: SHOULD NON-NAMED
SHAREHOLDERS BE PERMITTED TO APPEAL
ADVERSE JUDGMENTS?
Cecilia Lacey O'Connell+
A party's right to appeal a final judgment is deeply rooted in American
legal tradition.1 Less certain, however, is a nonparty's right to appeal
such judgments.2 This ambiguity concerning the right to appeal also
arises when the litigation involves non-named parties, such as in cases of
class actions and shareholder derivative litigation, wherein absent class
members and shareholders are considered parties to the suit only for
"certain purposes."3
+J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See ABA Comm. on Standards of Judicial Admin., 3 STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.10 commentary, at 18 (1994 ed.) (characterizing appellate review
as "a fundamental element of procedural fairness as generally understood in this coun-
try"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (granting jurisdiction to courts of appeal for all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States); FED. R. APP. P. 3, 3-4 (detailing pro-
cedural requirements for parties seeking appeal); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 175 (1803) (noting the importance of appellate review within the American judicial
system, as it "revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted"); Steven
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 408-
11, 425-26 (1995) (proposing that appellate review encourages trial court judges to exer-
cise more diligence and make fewer errors due to the prospect of reversal). Due process
guarantees do not mandate appellate review as long as "a full and fair trial on the merits is
provided." Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972). The Lindsey Court noted, how-
ever, that when appellate review is afforded, "it cannot be granted to some litigants and
capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 77.
2. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3902.1, at 102 (2d ed. 1992). Although the rule that a nonparty cannot ap-
peal a judgment appears "sensible," there exists a range of exceptions to this axiom
whereby nonparties should be treated as parties due to their interest in or relationship to
the pending litigation. See id. at 102-06. The law, however, remains unsettled and courts
have failed to formulate uniform standards governing nonparty appeals. See id. at 102.
3. See 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 1.07-.08 (2d ed.
1985) (highlighting the legal inconsistencies of nonparty status and noting that while class
members are considered parties as to the binding effect of judgments, they are not consid-
ered parties for purposes of filing briefs or motions and actively participating in trial); see
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In class actions and shareholder derivative suits, members of a class
aggregate their claims and entrust a named representative to litigate a
common complaint on their behalf.4 Such a system permits the litigation
of claims that otherwise would remain unheard due to the claim's small
size relative to the costs of trial.' Litigation under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 (Rule 23.1 or Rule), for example, specifically provides a
necessary check on corporate management through the use of derivative
also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 357 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the risks inherent in ambiguous party status and the problems presented
when courts analyze class members' rights in terms of physical presence rather than inter-
est in the litigation). Case law and commentaries use various terms denoting status, some-
times interchangeably. Within the context of this Comment, however, those who are
members of a shareholder class but are neither the named representatives nor formal par-
ties will be termed non-named parties.
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties"); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (stating "[i]n a derivative action
brought by one or more shareholders... [t]he derivative action may not be maintained if
it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
shareholders or members similarly situated"); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.02, at
23-22 to 23-23 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that the purpose of representative litigation is to
achieve expeditious and economic resolution of multi-party litigation); see also General
Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (emphasizing that class ac-
tions are the exception to the rule that litigation is conducted by named parties); Gottlieb
v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the need for protective mecha-
nisms in both class actions and derivative litigation due to the representative nature of the
suits); Timothy A. Duffy, Comment, The Appealability of Class Action Settlements by Un-
named Parties, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 933 (1993) (emphasizing the need for increased
court supervision and procedural safeguards in class actions due to reliance upon a class
representative).
Often the term "class member" is utilized to refer to a non-named party in Rule 23 class
action litigation. See, e.g., 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 1.07-.08. In the context of Rule
23.1 litigation, shareholder derivative actions, which is considered a special type of class
action no longer governed by Rule 23, parties other than the named representative are
generally referred to as "non-named parties," perhaps in an effort to connote the relevant
rule. Compare 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, §§ 23.1.10[1][b] (using the term
"non-parties" to refer to absent shareholders) with HON. THOMAS A. DICKERSON, CLASS
ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES § 1.10[1] (1998) (referencing "class members" in dis-
cussing absent parties in the class action context). See generally 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra, §§ 23 App.101, at 23App.-24 to 23App.-25 (discussing the evolution of
Rule 23(b) to Rule 23.1); 23.1 App.100, at 23.1App.-7 to 23.1App.-8, § 23.1.02[5] (discuss-
ing the interaction between Rules 23 and 23.1).
5. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasizing
the purpose of class and derivative litigation as enabling small claims to be litigated); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986) (analyzing the role of "agency costs" in representative
litigation and recognizing that the class members often have "only a nominal stake" in the
resolution of the suit). See generally Duffy, supra note 4, at 940-44 (providing an overview
of judicial approaches to the appealability of representative litigation while considering as
a variable the level of the plaintiff's interest in the suit).
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SUitS.6 By permitting the assembly of a class of shareholders, the deriva-
tive suit seeks a collective remedy for injuries to corporate interests,
while the reality of potential litigation forcefully deters future abuse of
the corporate form and director misconduct. Although this access to ju-
dicial redress, without the personal expenditure of time and cost for
complex litigation, can benefit a non-named party initially, the final dis-
position of the case may prove less satisfactory." Often, after relinquish-
ing control of the claim to a named representative, a non-named party
may find the proffered settlement inadequate.9 Yet, the non-named
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (providing for suit by one or more shareholders when a
corporation has neglected to enforce a legal right); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949) (discussing the need for procedural devices to
permit shareholders to litigate on behalf of a corporation in the context of a state deriva-
tive statute). Incorporation vested management with broad discretion in the execution of
"other people's money," while the increased dispersal of shareholders and resulting lack
of effective accountability of corporate management provided increased opportunities for
abuse. See id. at 547. Equity provided a remedy to this "stockholder helplessness"
through the shareholder derivative suit and thus became "the chief regulator of corporate
management." See id. at 548; see also Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit,
116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 77, 80 (1967) (arguing the importance of the derivative suit and its
"increasingly essential role in [the] economy" by citing the "broad managerial discretion"
afforded directors in terms of "property, dividends, capital, compensation, indemnifica-
tion, preemptive rights, by-laws, and delegation of authority") (footnotes omitted). See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 121-22, 141-145 (1998) (listing the broad powers and duties
conferred upon corporate management).
7. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 548 (noting that the derivative device "afford[s] no small
incentive to avoid.., grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders' interests"); Dykstra, supra
note 6, at 78-79 (emphasizing the role of the derivative suit as the "corporate policeman"
who "day in and day out" monitors the internal affairs of a corporation, bridging the sepa-
ration of control and ownership and thereby checking any tendency toward corporate mis-
conduct); George D. Hornstein, Future of Corporate Control, 63 HARV. L. REV. 476
(1950) (arguing that the existence of the device proves to be a significant deterrent to cor-
porate misconduct). But see Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the Share-
holder Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 139 (1985) (arguing against the significance of the shareholder device in today's cor-
porate world due to the "illusory or de minimis compensation" secured by shareholders as
a remedy, and the questionable role of shareholders and courts removed from the pres-
sures of the everyday business world in establishing standards of moral conduct for corpo-
rations).
8. See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholders Suits in Shareholder Inter-
ests? 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1735-37 (1994) (noting the low rate of success for shareholder
suits considering the high monetary awards to plaintiffs' counsel; constructing an economic
model to ascertain whether shareholders, rather than only the corporation, actually bene-
fit from representative litigation).
9. See Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (deter-
mining the standing of an objector to a shareholder suit who argued that the proffered set-
tlement, which included over $2.5 million in attorney's fees and only corporate governance
measures, did not benefit the corporation); Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310-11 (arguing that
corporate governance measures secured by the named plaintiff were "illusory"); Tryforos
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party's ability to object to the settlement may be limited."'
Courts have struggled recently with the proper procedural limitations
to place upon non-named parties desiring to appeal the dismissal or set-
tlement of class action and shareholder derivative litigation." In several
circuits, a non-named party is now required to intervene formally in the
litigation to preserve a right to appeal the merits of the judgment. 2 In
others, an appearance is the only prerequisite to the right to appeal. 3
This Term, an evenly divided United States Supreme Court affirmed,
without opinion, a circuit court decision requiring intervention, further
obscuring the right to appellate review for individuals within a class of
persons. Due to the absence of judicial guidance from the Supreme
Court and the continued incongruity of federal procedural law, the issue
of appealability by non-named parties in derivative litigation is of para-
mount concern.15
This Comment first examines the development of Rule 23.1, empha-
sizing its equitable origins and shared history with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 (Rule 23). Part I explores the operation of the Rule during
v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1260-63 (7th Cir. 1975) (determining an objector had
standing to argue against the default judgment of shareholder litigation following the
named plaintiffs' failure to litigate the case).
10. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1839, at 182 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that an objector to a settlement can appeal the settle-
ment order but the objector's right to appeal may be limited). But see 15A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 2, § 3902.1, at 102-03 (stating that nonparties of any kind, including share-
holder objectors, have no right to appeal adverse settlements).
11. Compare In re Painewebber Inc. Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 94 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that non-named class members need not intervene to preserve the right to
appeal); Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); In re
Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), with Shults v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1059, 1061 (6th Cir. 1994) (requiring intervention pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24); Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 679-
80 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071, 1073-74 (5th Cir.
1988) (same); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628 (11th Cir. 1987) (same). See generally
infra Parts I.D., II. (discussing the circuit split).
12. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted in part sub
nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998), affd 119
S. Ct. 720 (1999); Shults, 35 F.3d at 1061; Loran v. Furr's/Bishop's Inc., 988 F.2d 554, 554
(5th Cir. 1993); Croyden Assocs., 969 F.2d at 679-80; Guthrie, 815 F.2d at 628-29.
13. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310; see also Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011
(10th Cir. 1993) (discussing the Seventh Circuit's decision).
14. See California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999).
15. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.
1998) (asserting that the current circuit split creates confusion regarding federal proce-
dural law and the purpose of Rule 23); Shareholder Lawsuits: Nonintervenors Cannot
Later Appeal Settlement, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1999, at B23 [hereinafter Shareholder Law-
suits] (concluding that "the Supreme Court's 4-4 split means the issue will remain
clouded").
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the dismissal or settlement of an action, and the competing approaches of
the circuits in determining the requirements for the preservation of ap-
peal by non-named parties. Next, Part II analyzes the implications of
these distinct approaches, on both the shareholder derivative suit as a ju-
dicial device and in the context of the goals and purposes of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III asserts that requiring an appearance
by an objecting non-named party, rather than formal intervention, will
most adequately serve the principles of the American judicial system.
This Comment concludes by recommending the use of new judicial
mechanisms in tandem with existing provisions of federal procedure to
reinforce the efficacy of an appearance requirement.
I. THE RISE OF RESTRICTIONS ON APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23.1
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1
Rule 23.1 establishes the procedure through which the judiciary en-
forces the fiduciary duties of corporate managers. 6 To litigate a corpo-
rate injury, one or more stockholders sues derivatively in place of the
corporation that has neglected or declined to enforce a legal rightY.
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (stating that the scope of the Rule applies to sharehold-
ers who wish "to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted
by it"); see also Kraakman et al., supra note 8, at 1733-34. Rule 23.1 sets forth only the
procedural requirements of shareholder derivative actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; see
also Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 802-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying substantive law
of Ohio and federal procedural rules to shareholder action). Derivative suits are therefore
subject to state substantive law and can be heard only by federal courts on the basis of di-
versity jurisdiction or a federal question. See id.; see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b) (1994) (prohibiting federal procedural rules from enlarging substantive rights);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (holding that state substantive law
and federal procedural law apply in diversity actions).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; Kraakman et al., supra note 8, at 1734; see also 5
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 23.1.02[3][b], at 23.1-10 to -11 (listing
types of corporate injuries that can be litigated through a derivative suit). Acceptable
claims may include: fraud on the corporation, see Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
916 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1990), failure of the corporation to pursue legal rights or litiga-
tion, see Peck v. General Motors Corp., 894 F.2d 844, 847-48 (6th Cir. 1990), or claims
against corporate officers or majority shareholders for waste or mismanagement, see
Burghart v. Landau, 821 F. Supp. 173, 177 (S.D. N.Y. 1993), affd 9 F.3d 1538 (2d Cir.
1993). But see Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881) impliedly overruled by Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) (dismissing a shareholder claim due
to the personal nature of the asserted right; emphasizing the importance of the corporate
structure within the shareholder suit). Examples of injuries that must be pursued through
standard litigation because they are direct or personal and not "corporate" in nature in-
clude actions to compel dividends, suits arising from interference with voting rights, and
1999]
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In 1966, the promulgation of Rule 23.1 separated derivative actions
from Rule 23 class actions. 8 Rule 23.1 requires a litigant to comply with
several procedural safeguards: verification of the complaint as involving
a corporate injury; a statement of contemporaneous ownership of stock;
an affirmative allegation of a lack of collusion among the shareholders;
and an explanation of the exhaustion of internal, non-judicial remedies.' 9
In recognition of the representative nature of derivative litigation, the
Rule warns that a suit is subject to dismissal should the named plaintiff
cease to "fairly and adequately represent" the concerns of the class of
shareholders.' °
Reflecting the public policy favoring settlement of derivative litigation
• 21
prior to a decision on the merits, the Rule includes two specific re-
individual contract claims. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4,
§ 23.1.02[3][b], at 23.1-11 to -12.
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, advisory committee's note on the 1966 Amendments.
Equity Rule 94, adopted in 1882 by the Supreme Court to codify prior case law originally
governed shareholder derivative litigation. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 4, § 23.1App.100 (Historical Appendix). The rule required "[eJvery bill brought by
one or more stockholders in a corporation, against the corporation.., which may properly
be asserted by the corporation must be verified by oath and must contain an allegation
that the plaintiff was a shareholder." Equity Rule 94,104 U.S. ix., ix-x. (1882) (superseded
by Equity Rule 27). In 1912, Equity Rule 27 replaced Equity Rule 94 with only slight
modification. See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
LITIGATION: BESIEGING THE BOARD § 1.03, at 1-17 (1998). The most textually similar
current rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) adopted in 1938. See id.; see also 5
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 23.lApp.100, at 23.lApp-7 to -8.
Due to the inclusion of derivative litigation within the class action procedure, Rule 23.1
utilized similar procedures for dismissal and compromise as class actions. See 7C WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 10, § 1821, at 13. In 1966, extensive revision of Rule 23 resulted in the
separation of derivative litigation and class actions into two separate rules through the
adoption of Rule 23.1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1, advisory committee's note on the 1966
Amendments. This revision formally included the requirements of notice and the dis-
missal or compromise and adequate representation in the text of Rule 23.1. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee's note on the 1966 Amendments; see also FERRARA ET
AL., supra, § 1.03, at 1-19-20. One of the reasons for this demarcation was the recognition
that derivative actions could be brought even when the number of shareholders was too
small to justify a class action. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 1821, at 13-14. De-
rivative and class actions may still be combined, however, when the injury alleged affects
the entire corporation and is maintainable by a number of shareholders as a class. See,
e.g., Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1441 (10th Cir. 1995).
19. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1 (listing pleading requirements).
20. See id.; see also Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1990)
(utilizing an abuse of discretion standard on appeal, to ascertain whether the trial court's
finding of adequate representation was appropriate); Davis v. Coined, Inc., 619 F.2d 588,
593-94 (6th Cir. 1980) (listing factors to consider in determining the adequacy of the plain-
tiff shareholders as representatives of the class).
21. See In re Pacific Enter. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the ju-
dicial policy favoring settlement of shareholder derivative litigation; stating that derivative
shareholder suits that proceed to trial are "rarely successful"); Maher v. Zapata Corp., 714
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quirements concerning the dismissal or compromise of the cause of ac-
tion." First, prior to the resolution of the litigation, notice of the com-
promise must first be sent to all shareholders, and second, the court must
approve the settlement based on fairness."
B. Early Law: An Emphasis on Equitable Considerations
Courts deciding shareholder derivative claims predating the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure often considered the equitable
24
origins of derivative actions. At common law, a shareholder wishing to
redress a corporate injury, such as a director's breach of fiduciary duty,
lacked sufficient standing because the corporation, and not the share-
holder, suffered the injury-in-fact. Equity overlooks this distinction and
permits the shareholder to stand in the shoes of the corporation and seek
relief.16 Thus, even though the corporation is designated as the defen-
dant, the corporation is actually the plaintiff, suing in the name of an
F.2d 436, 455 (5th Cir. 1983) (favoring settlements of shareholder litigation due to the
"unpredictable" nature of such suits); see also CARL ROBERT ARON ET AL., 2 CLASS
ACTIONS: LAW & PRACTICE § 26:17 (1987) (recognizing both in practice and caselaw "a
clear public policy" favoring out of court resolution of shareholder derivative litigation);
cf Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1314 n.16 (3d Cir. 1993) (reasoning that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to encourage settlements).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (requiring notice and court approval of a settlement); see
also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 532 n.7 (1984) (emphasizing that the
requirement of notice and court approval are designed to protect the legitimate interests
of the company and its shareholders).
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (hold-
ing that due process requires that a litigant whose rights are adjudicated be afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heard); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1972)
(ruling that notice is essential to ensuring that the interests of the corporation and absent
stockholders are addressed); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4,
§ 23.1.10[2][a] (listing substantive requirements for voluntary dismissals including fairness,
adequacy, reasonableness, and a lack of fraud or collusion; noting the importance of such
considerations given the interests of non-party shareholders).
24. See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 453 (1881), impliedly overruled by
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 331, 341 (1855); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03 (providing an
overview of the equitable history of Rule 23.1).
25. See Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1983). See generally Fox, 464
U.S. at 527-28 (discussing the nature of the corporate injury and the necessary reliance
upon equitable principles to create a cause of action).
26. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 454 (stating that the equitable principles discussed in
Dodge allow a stockholder "to step in between" the corporation and the wrongdoer and
take control of the litigation of rights belonging to the corporation); see also Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547-48 (1949) (noting the rationale for the ap-
plication of equitable remedies, as the separation of control and ownership in the corpo-
rate structure).
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owner, the shareholder.27
The Supreme Court's decision in Dodge v. Woolsey18 is generally con-
sidered the first to "firmly establish[]" American courts' ability to dis-
pose of shareholder derivative actions through equitable devices 29The
Court provided remedies that were otherwise unavailable to the single
litigant, by granting standing through equity, to a bank shareholder de-
siring to redress the corporate bank's willingness to pay an unconstitu-
tional tax."' In response to the Court's permissive holding in Dodge, nu-
merous shareholders filed derivative suits.31
In Hawes v. Oakland,32 the Court subsequently imposed several proce-
dural and substantive guidelines for derivative litigation, narrowing the
availability of the remedy but preserving its equitable nature.33 A share-
holder in the Contra Costa Waterworks Company filed suit against the
27. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (referring to the dual nature
of the corporate entity in shareholder derivative suits).
28. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855).
29. FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-13. The court rationalized the inter-
vention between the corporation and its owners by citing a breach of trust. See Dodge, 59
U.S. at 341. The Court noted,
[iut is now no longer doubted, either in England or the United States, that courts
of equity, in both, have a jurisdiction over corporations, at the instance of one or
more of their members; to apply preventative remedies by injunction, to restrain
those who administer them from doing acts which would amount to a violation of
charters, or to prevent any misapplication of their capitals or profits.
Id.; see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-13 (discussing the role of equity in
the Dodge rationale).
30. See Dodge, 59 U.S. at 339, 341; see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, 1-
13 to -14 (concluding that equity provided a form of recovery for the shareholder who had
no standing at law to commence a civil action for a director's breach of fiduciary duties).
A single litigant was barred from bringing an action on his own behalf as the grievance
alleged was not personal. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547-48. See generally 7C WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 10, § 1821, at 9 (discussing the equitable origins of Rule 23.1 and empha-
sizing the corresponding application of equity maxims and principles to shareholder de-
rivative litigation).
31. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 452 (stating that the issue of shareholder derivative
standing is "a matter of very great interest, and of growing importance in the courts of the
United States;" describing the recent abuses of the device by shareholders to gain federal
jurisdiction over claims); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-15.
32. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
33. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 452, 460-61 (justifying the use of the equitable device and
limiting its use to certain corporate wrongs after exhaustion of extra-judicial remedies and
pleading of grievances with particularity); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464
U.S. 523, 530-33 (1984) (discussing the Court's decision in Hawes as predicated upon the
need to establish defined requirements for maintaining a derivative suit in light of the po-
tential for abuse); FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-15 to -16 (underscoring that
the Hawes Court issued procedural requirements in the wake of numerous shareholder
suits).
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company, the City of Oakland, and trustees and directors of the com-14
pany. The substance of the shareholder's allegation involved the unlaw-
ful conversion of the company's water by the city for non-emergency
uses." The shareholder argued that the company's compliance with the
city's demand for use of the water decreased the value of his shares.36
The lower court dismissed the case for lack of standing and the absence
of a valid controversy, on the basis that the corporate by-laws included a
water agreement with the city.,,
On appeal, the Supreme Court fleetingly discussed the merits of the
case but spent considerable time refining the necessary elements of a
corporate cause of action.3" Noting the characteristics of the "body poli-
tic and corporate," as well as equitable principles espoused in several
English cases, the Court refused to extend jurisdiction to a shareholder
pursuing an essentially personal claim. 9
The Hawes Court then set forth the circumstances that would permit a
stockholder to sustain, in his own name, a suit that litigates corporate
rights.40 These substantive circumstances include ultra vires actions by
34. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 450-51.
35. See id. at 451.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 451-52.
38. See id. at 450-52 (discussing the merits of the case); at 452-60 (reviewing the equi-
table history of shareholder suits and the Dodge decision); at 460-62 (delineating elements
of a proper shareholder cause of action).
39. See id. at 453-54, 461-62. The Court characterized the personal injury complained
of in the case before it as "diminished" dividends. See id. at 462.
40. See id. at 460-61. The issue of whether an injury is corporate or personal is still
debated. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 1821, at 8-9 (noting the determination
of whether a suit is derivative or direct is not resolved easily). The courts today often term
the injury either "[djirect," and therefore personal to the shareholder, or indirect, and
therefore necessitating that the shareholder sue "derivatively." See id. at 4-8. Specifically,
the cause of action must be founded upon a corporate right for the shareholder to main-
tain the action on a representative, not personal, basis. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 528 (1984). Correspondingly, the remedy sought must benefit the
whole corporation. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (10th Cir. 1993).
Today the text of Rule 23.1 refers to the verification of a corporate cause of action,
noting that the injury to the corporation must be alleged as "enforc[ing] a right which may
properly be asserted by it." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. This verification requirement is often
linked to a desire to avoid "strike suits," in which a shareholder brings a suit lacking sub-
stantial factual basis, with the goal of obtaining a settlement. See Surowitz v. Hilton Ho-
tels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1966) (assessing the verification requirement in light of
"strike suit" abuse); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-18 (defining a
"strike suit" as a suit lacking a basis in law or fact and instead being brought "simply for
the purpose of obtaining an extortion-like settlement from the defendants or the corpora-
tion's management"). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 13-33
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corporate management,41 fraudulent transactions by management that
could damage the corporation or shareholders' interests, destructive or
oppressive actions of either corporate ownership or a majority of share-
holders, and "other cases" justifying the exercise of equitable powers to
prevent "irremediable injury. 4 1 Perhaps due to the breadth of this last
category, the Court attached several additional limitations to the plead-
ing stage of derivative actions.43
During the same term as the decision in Hawes, the Court codified the
procedural limitations through the adoption of Equity Rule 94.44 More
than one hundred years after Hawes and the subsequent adoption of fed-
eral rules governing civil procedure, the courts continue to apply these
equitable principles and criteria to shareholder derivative litigation.45
(1985) (providing an economic analysis of "strike suits"; proposing that multiple cases
must be considered to understand the merit of frivolous actions to plaintiff attorneys).
41. The term ultra vires refers to acts beyond the scope of the powers of a corpora-
tion as delineated in the corporate charter. See State ex rel. v. Holston Trust Co., 79
S.W.2d 1012, 1016 (Tenn. 1935). The Hawes Court noted that when a corporate board of
directors acts in its own interests or in a manner destructive of the company, the aid of eq-
uity could be invoked. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460.
42. Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460.
43. See id. at 460-61. These limitations included a showing by the shareholder, "to
the satisfaction of the court," that internal remedies had been previously pursued. See id.
Rule 23.1 retains this requirement today and courts commonly refer to it as the "intra-
corporate" demand. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (stating that "[t]he complaint shall also al-
lege ... the efforts ... made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from
the directors or comparable authority").
In addition to averring with particularity a shareholder's initial non-judicial attempts,
the shareholder must allege that he or she was an owner of the stock at the time of the
complained-of transgressions or that he or she received the shares by operation of the law.
See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 461. This requirement continues today and is known as the "con-
temporaneous ownership" requirement. See 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
4, at § 32.1.0711]; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (stating that the plaintiff must be "a shareholder...
at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or ... devolved on the plain-
tiff by operation of law"). Finally, in response to the spate of shareholder suits utilizing
the diversity of shareholder citizenship to gain federal jurisdiction, the Hawes Court re-
quired an affirmative statement by the shareholder that the suit was not collusive. See
Hawes, 104 U.S. at 461. Rule 23.1 still requires this preliminary statement. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1.
44. See Quincy v. Steel, 120 U.S. 241, 245 (1887) (referring to Hawes and stating "[i]n
order to give effect to the principles there laid down this court at that term adopted Rule
94 of the Rules of Practice for Courts of Equity of the United States"); 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, at § 23.lApp.01[3].
45. See, e.g., Fox, 464 U.S. at 528 (addressing the corporate right and injury pre-
requisites); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703,
708 (1974) (mandating "contemporaneous ownership" and disregarding the corporate en-
tity in deference to fairness and public interest); Sax v. World Wide Press, Inc., 809 F.2d
610, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that the grievance pleaded by the plaintiff was essen-
tially personal in nature and not the proper subject of a shareholder derivative action).
The equitable origins of Rule 23.1 have also led to the use of equitable defenses in
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C. Operation of the Rule: Mechanics of Dismissal and the Influence of
Rule 23
The unique attributes and equitable origins of Rule 23.1 account for
the requirements that notice and court approval be effected prior to fi-
nalizing any settlement.46  These requirements aim to increase share-
holder participation and to prevent private settlement of a suit that al-• 47
lows the named plaintiff and his or her counsel to profit personally.
In addition to encouraging just settlements, courts have utilized the no-
tice requirement to assess whether a non-named party should be granted
48 4
appellate review. In Cohen v. Young,49 the Sixth Circuit held that an
objector to a shareholder derivative settlement had standing to argue on
appeal against the merits of the compromise and the right to present evi-
dence. o Of central importance to the court's reasoning was the objec-
tor's appearance in court, in response to the court's show cause notice
regarding the proposed settlement.5' The court analogized this notice to
a summons by process of the court, and held that the appellant was a
party of right. 2 This status automatically provided the objector with a
right to present evidence and to advocate in court against the compro-
shareholder derivative actions. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 10, § 1821, at 12; see
also Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 530-532 (1947) (per-
mitting the application of the equitable defense that one who seeks redress from a court of
equity must do equity).
46. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring notice and court approval of dismissal or com-
promise in derivative actions); Amendments to Rules on Civil Procedure - Admiralty and
Maritime - Criminal Procedure with Report of the Judicial Conference, 39 F.R.D. 73, 108
(1966) (Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 23.1) (noting the distinctive aspects of share-
holder litigation, which necessitated a separate rule and additional procedural require-
ments; supporting the court's authority to direct settlement proceedings by noting the "in-
herent power" of the court); cf. also 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 22.81, at 162 & n.422
(explaining that although class actions and derivative litigation create similar procedural
problems, the division of the two rules resulted in separate, specific requirements for
each); supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency toward settle-
ment in representative litigation and the need for corresponding protective mechanisms).
47. See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 1839, at 175-76 (asserting that require-
ments of court approval and notice afford protection to shareholders from disadvanta-
geous settlements).
48. See Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1994) (determin-
ing that the notice of a class action settlement was not sufficiently "mandatory" and there-
fore did not necessitate a grant of appellate review); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724
(6th Cir. 1942) (concluding that a non-named shareholder had standing to appeal the mer-
its of a settlement as the notice was analogous to a court summons).
49. 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942).
50. See id. at 724.
51. See id.
52. See id. The court expanded this grant of standing by concluding that implicit in a
right to appeal is a general right to be heard. See id.
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The Sixth Circuit further supported this broad grant of judicial audi-
ence by addressing the purpose of court notice. 4 Emphasizing that the
goals of then-Rule 23(c) did not justify settlements that were solely the
product of attorneys' recommendations, the court noted that implicit in
the notice requirement is a request for "broader information."" This
procedure benefits the court considering a settlement, through the re-
ceipt of advice and "views of all parties concerned. 56 Consequently, an
objector to a settlement may serve to ensure a more judicious and in-
formed settlement. 7
Should a shareholder subsequently learn of the settlement by court no-
tice, however, his or her ability to object to the proposed compromise
presently varies by jurisdiction depending on the form of the objections. 8
The forms of objection available to non-named parties arguing against a
settlement may include written objections, appearance at the hearing by
counsel, or appearance at the hearing by the non-named party. 9 Some
courts have required formal intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24.60
53. See id.
54. See id. at 725.
55. Id.
56. Id. The court summarized its analysis, stating "the rule was adopted to secure not
routine approval of a consent decree, but in order to insure supervision of the court for the
protection of the corporation and all the stockholders." Id.
57. See id. at 725-26 (concluding that the court would be unable to protect the inter-
ests of the corporation and the hundreds of absent stockholders through singular reliance
upon the advice of plaintiff's counsel).
58. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (noting the current circuit court
split regarding requirements to preserve appellate review).
59. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (granting ap-
pellate review to non-named parties who attended settlement hearing and voice opposi-
tion); Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1975) overruled
by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that written objections to
the form of dismissal were sufficient to gain appellate review and within the "underlying
purpose" of Rule 23.1's notice requirement); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note
4, § 23.1.10[3] (discussing current circuit confusion and noting various forms of objection
utilized by non-named shareholders).
60. See, e.g., Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998) aff'd sub nom Cali-
fornia Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999); Shults v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1994); Loran v. Furr's/Bishop's Inc., 988 F.2d
554, 554 (5th Cir. 1993); Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 678-80 (8th Cir.
1992); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (stating "when the applicant claims an interest re-
lating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is
so situated that the disposition ... may... impair or impede the applicant's ability to pro-
tect that interest" an applicant will be permitted to intervene and become a named party
"unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties"). Commen-
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These varying requirements regarding the proper steps an objector
must take to secure an appeal are further complicated by the United
States Supreme Court's ruling in Marino v. Ortiz. In Marino, white po-
lice officers, who were not parties to a consolidated class action arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, objected to the consent
decree." Although the officers presented objections to the district court,
their failure to intervene formally proved destructive to their claim.63
The Supreme Court, adopting a literal interpretation of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3(c), concluded that the law regarding nonparty
appeals was "well settled."6 The text of Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-
cedure 3(c) utilizes the terms "party" and "parties" in delineating the
necessary procedures for appeal. 65 The Court adhered to a strict textual-
ist analysis of the rule, despite its admission that an exception could be
entertained "when the nonparty has an interest that is affected by the
trial court's judgment."66 Refusing to depart from the literal words of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c), the Court summarily held that
it was "better practice ... for such a nonparty to seek intervention for
purposes of appeal."67
tators continue to debate the "ease" of intervention. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 954-55;
N.E. Paolini, Recent Development, Walker v. City of Mesquite: The Nonappealability of
Class Action Consent Decrees by Nonnamed Class Members, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1732, 1738
(1989) (noting the inherent problems for class members in securing intervention, as the
very nature of representative litigation assumes adequate representation of class members'
interests by the named plaintiffs).
61. 484 U.S. 301 (1988) (per curiam).
62. See id. at 302-04.
63. See id. at 304.
64. See id. In addition to citing the rule and case law, the Court referenced United
States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397, 402 (1917). See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
That seminal case denied Louisiana's request to appeal the purchase of land by a private
individual from a state agency. See Jack, 244 U.S. at 398. The Court stated the reason for
the denial as "no person can bring a writ of error [an appeal is not different] to reverse a
judgment who is not a party or privy to the record." Id. at 402 (quoting Bayard v.
Lombard, 9 How. 530, 551 (1850)) (emphasis added). Following this seemingly conclusive
rationale, however, the Court did hint at some flexibility to the rule. See id. at 406. The
Court noted that there was "a class of cases to which this case does not belong," with re-
spect to which the authority of the Court to make new parties to a suit is plenary. See id.
In determining whether the State was sufficiently "aggrieved" to invoke the discretion of
the Court to name additional parties, the Court emphasized the lack of a "beneficial inter-
est." Id. at 403-05.
65. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(c) (stating the "notice of appeal must specify the party or
parties taking the appeal") (emphasis added).
66. Marino, 484 U.S. at 303-04 (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1152 (2d Cir.
1986)).
67. Id. The Court dismissed preemptively arguments of procedural unfairness by re-
marking that "denials of such [intervention] motions are, of course, appealable." Id.
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Since Marino, courts have considered the attributes and goals of class
action and shareholder derivative litigation in determining the rules' pro-
. 68
cedural effect on representative litigation. The shared history of Rule
23, governing class actions, and Rule 23.1, governing shareholder deriva-
tive litigation, results in a similarity of procedural devices and goals.69
Both rules seek to achieve like goals, such as judicial efficiency, by con-
solidating small claims that arise from the same controversy.7° Conse-
quently, when determining whether a non-named party may appeal,
71courts often defer to this goal of judicial economy.
By contrast, courts have also utilized distinctions between the two
rules to support rulings that may contradict this common goal of judicial72 • 71
economy. In Gottlieb v. Wiles, the Tenth Circuit denied standing to a
non-named party in a class action securities suit due to the party's failure
68. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1442-43 (10th Cir. 1995); Gott-
lieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 1993) (comparing Rules 23 and 23.1 to de-
termine if an objector in representative litigation should be granted standing).
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 23.1 & advisory committee's note on the 1966 Amend-
ments (evidencing an identity of language and purpose with respect to requirements of
court notice and adequate representation); see also, 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 22.81, at
162-63 (noting that although Rule 23.1 has distinct attributes for pleading, the derivative
suit is in reality "a special category of class suit," subject to similar concerns and analysis).
Although the 1966 Amendments separated the rules governing derivative suits from class
actions and added additional pleading requirements, the new Rule 23.1 did not "disturb
the procedural balance previously established in this kind of litigation." Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing the Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 & n.188 (1976).
70. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304,1309 (3d Cir. 1993) (addressing the
issue of shareholder standing by considering the derivative suit's aggregation of multiple
claims); Rosenbaum, 64 F.3d at 1442; Paolini, supra note 60, at 1734 (explaining that Rule
23 litigation is designed to prevent multiplicity of actions involving common questions and
to obtain a final determination of the issues); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Felzen v. Andreas, 143 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998) affd by an equally
divided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct.
720 (1999) (per curiam) (recognizing the validity of monitoring to ensure just settlements,
but refusing to consider the merits of the proffered settlement as the objectors had failed
to intervene and become named parties); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litig., 115 F.3d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir.
1997) (denying appellate standing to non-named class members and those who had previ-
ously opted out due to the "veritable avalanche of appeals" and the dilution of control of
the class that would inevitably occur). See generally FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18,
§ 1.05, at 1-35 (recognizing that although the procedural requirements of Rule 23.1 are fo-
cused on providing fairness to both shareholders and the corporation, the inherent com-
plexity and burden of these requirements may forestall their use).
72. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, 64 F.3d at 1442-43 (permitting a non-intervening class
member to appeal a settlement despite concerns that they may represent a lone dissident
and reasoning that the same rationale should apply in the derivative context); Gottlieb, 11
F.3d at 1010-11.
73. 11 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 1993).
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to intervene; however, the court noted that such appellate review should
be available in shareholder derivative litigation.74 In applying a balancing
test weighing the fairness of the settlement and the preservation of judi-
cial resources, the court utilized Rule 23.1 to emphasize the soundness of
the denial of a non-named party's claim in a class action context.75 The
court noted that derivative litigation does not offer the same protective
mechanisms as class actions, such as an affirmative and preliminary de-
termination of adequate representation, opt-out provisions, and benefits
accruing directly to both class members and named plaintiffs' counsel;
therefore, it merits the protection of appealability. 6 Consequently, while
the courts are increasingly cognizant of the necessary balance between
procedural safeguards to protect absent non-named parties and the fed-
eral courts' goal of settlement in potentially protracted and costly litiga-
tion, the analysis of the propriety of non-named party appeals remains
17inconsistent and grounded in the factual circumstances of each case.
D. The Circuit Split: Competing Approaches to the Preservation of
Appeals by Non-named Parties
1. The Third Circuit View: Policy Above Procedure
Early decisions in the Third Circuit liberally provided for appeals by
non-named parties, even granting appellate review to non-named parties
who had failed to object or appear in the trial court.8 In 1993, however,
74. See id. at 1009-10 (denying appellate review to non-intervening class members for
policy reasons, including judicial economy, but acknowledging that the same rationale was
inapplicable in the shareholder derivative litigation due to the absence of protective
mechanisms); see also Rosenbaum, 64 F.3d at 1442 (reasoning that the analysis utilized in
Gottlieb "might be read to support" standing to appeal shareholder derivative litigation by
objectors).
75. See Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009-11 (refusing to extend appellate standing to class
members who failed to intervene due to the potential for unlimited appeals; concluding,
however, that in the shareholder derivative context these efficiency concerns were of less
importance considering the lack of procedural protections).
76. See id. at 1011.
77. See id. at 1007 (explaining the balancing test); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2
F.3d 1304, 1307 (3d Cir. 1993); 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 23.02, at
23-22 to 23-33 (noting that while a goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is judicial
economy, representative litigation is also designed to provide a remedy otherwise "not
economically feasible" due to litigation costs).
78. See, e.g., In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d
1058, 1064-67 (3d Cir. 1976); Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32-
33 (3d Cir. 1971). Ace is generally considered to have demonstrated the outer limit of ap-
pealability by non-named parties. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 934-35. The court found that
non-named class members had standing to appeal a settlement in a nationwide antitrust
case despite the fact that members had an opportunity to opt-out. See Ace, 453 F.2d at 32.
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the Third Circuit limited this unconditional approach by requiring a
court appearance to preserve the right of appellate review for non-
named parties.79 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger,8° the Third Circuit con-
sidered the appeal of several objecting shareholders arguing against the
adequacy of a settlement approved by the lower court.8 The Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the terms of the settlement were in fact fair 2 and held
that the objectors who had appeared at the settlement hearing had
standing to appeal the merits of the compromise.83
The case arose following a 1990 settlement of consumer fraud claims
instituted by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania against Bell Atlantic
Corporation. 4 The expenditure of corporate assets pursuant to the set-
tlement resulted in two parallel shareholder derivative actions. 85 One
group of shareholders, represented by Seymour Lazar, instituted an ac-
tion in the Pennsylvania state courts, while another shareholder group,
represented by Martha Taub, initially made a demand and sought intra-
corporate relief.86 Rejection of this initial demand on the corporation
prompted the Taub group to file a derivative action in federal court on
behalf of a class of Bell Atlantic shareholders.87 Prior to filing, the Taub
Relying on Ace, later courts expanded the flexibility of nonparty appeals and reasoned
that the adjudication of the legal rights of class members by settlement is sufficient to jus-
tify appellate standing. See Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir.
1977). The Ace court further reasoned that appellate review was a necessary check on un-
fair settlements. See id.; Duffy, supra note 4, at 935. The status of this holding is uncer-
tain, however, given later holdings requiring at least an appearance to register an objec-
tion. See Bell Atlantic 2 F.3d at 1310; Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1059,
1061 (6th Cir. 1994); Croyden Assocs. v Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1992);
see also Duffy, supra note 4, at 935 (noting the uncertainty of Ace's precedential value in
light of subsequent holdings).
79. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310.
80. 2 F.3d 1304 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. See id. at 1310.
82. See id. at 1318.
83. See id. at 1310.
84. See id. at 1306. The settlement involved a violation of Pennsylvania's unfair prac-
tices and consumer protection laws and resulted in $40 million in customer refunds, con-
sumer education trust fund contributions, and legal costs payable to the Attorney General.
See id. at 1306 & n.2.
85. See id. at 1306.
86. See id. Lazar's group charged Bell Atlantic's officers and directors with misman-
agement and breach of fiduciary duty. See id. The Taub group, in compliance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, first "made a demand" on Bell Atlantic's board to re-
cover corporate expenditures from those officers responsible for the mismanagement. See
id.
87. See id. The complaint included three counts; the first two counts were comprised
of federal and state claims based on non-disclosure and the third consisted of the deriva-
tive claim which alleged mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duties. See id.
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group notified Lazar's counsel of the suit, yet Lazar did not attempt to
intervene. 8 Following pre-trial preparation, the Taub group and Bell
Atlantic reached a compromise.8 9 The compromise included a release of
all claims "arising from the Bell of Pennsylvania consumer fraud litiga-
tion," thereby precluding Lazar's pending state claim.9° Pursuant to Rule
23.1, the proposed agreement was filed in district court and a notice
summarizing the terms and announcing the date of the settlement hear-
ing was sent to the shareholder class.91 In response, twenty-five share-
holders, including Lazar, objected to the terms of the settlement.92 Coun-
sel for Lazar and others attended the settlement hearing and argued
against the compromise.93 The district court, however, denied the objec-
tions and approved the settlement.94
On appeal, the Third Circuit initially addressed contrary authority as-
serting the need for formal intervention under Rule 24 to preserve repre-
sentative litigation's goal of judicial efficiency. 9 In a footnote, the court
summarily disposed of recent Supreme Court precedent requiring inter-
vention and lauding the ease and appealability of a Rule 24 motion.96 Al-
though Marino had advanced as the "better practice," intervention by
nonparties to secure appellate review,7 the Third Circuit concluded that
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1307. The settlement, in addition to providing non-pecuniary benefits to
the corporation via the increased monitoring of sales and marketing staff, established a fee
cap of $450,000 for attorneys' fees. See id. Following the approval of the settlement, at-
torneys for the plaintiff were allocated just over $420,000. See id.
91. See id. The shareholder class included all 1.1 million Bell Atlantic shareholders.
See id. In addition to settlement terms and the hearing date, the notice included a descrip-




95. See id. at 1307-08. Terming the potential for multiple individual appeals "un-
wieldy," the court warned that such practice could defeat the purpose of class action litiga-
tion. See id. at 1308. Although the court declined at the outset to address whether class
action and derivative suits necessitated different rules regarding objector standing, the
court specifically cited the lack of an "opt-out" provision in Rule 23.1 litigation as a dis-
tinction that warranted consideration. See id.; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02, at 41 (promulgated and
adopted May 13, 1992) (noting that "shareholders normally cannot opt out of the class and
pursue their own individual action"). Recognition of this distinction is fundamental to as-
sessing the interplay between the binding effect of judgment and the need for appellate
review. See infra II.A.1. (discussing the binding effects of judgment).
96. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1307-08 & n.6 (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301
(1988) and stating that unlike Lazar, the non-party appellants in Marino were neither
members of a class nor shareholders).
97. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304; see also Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1308.
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this reasoning was inapplicable to the case at bar.98 The Court distin-
guished Marino by noting that the resolution in that case involved
strangers to a class action, whereas the Bell Atlantic case involved the
rights of a shareholder objector who was neither a stranger nor a non-
party to the underlying litigation.99
Fundamental to the Third Circuit's analysis in Bell Atlantic were
agency doctrine, which is analogous to the principles of derivative litiga-
tion, and policy considerations.' °° A preeminent policy concern involved
the widespread problem of disproportionate attorneys' fees.'0 ' In apply-
ing agency principles to derivative litigation, the court noted that such
collective mechanisms may engender increased "information con-
straints," such as miscommunication, divided loyalties, and divergent
prioritization of interests between the named representative and the en-
tire class.' °2
Finally, the court quickly deflected judicial concerns that the lack of
procedural requirements necessary to obtain appellate review could cre-
ate "unwieldy" litigation.' 3 The court noted the benefits of representa-
tive litigation and held that the goal of fair and adequate settlements
outweighed these procedural concerns. 4 In sum, the court in Bell At-
lantic decided that if an objector attended a settlement hearing and
voiced concerns before the district court, as Lazar did, his or her ability
to appeal is guaranteed.'5
A lack of available information due to the named representatives' fail-
ure to relay the concerns and objections of the entire class could seri-
ously impede the proper resolution of a case.' 6 Ignorance of opposing
98. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1308 & n.6.
99. See id.; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (explaining the unique status
of shareholders as both parties and non-parties to suits depending on the stage of litiga-
tion).
100. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1308-10.
101. See id. at 1310. The court noted that the risk that a settlement could be reached
in which the attorneys' fees were disproportionate to the relief granted was considerable.
See id. The court therefore found that the risk demands flexibility in judicial procedure
and an easy means to challenge derivative action settlement agreements. See id. See gen-
erally Coffee, supra note 40, at 33-69 (examining in detail the organization of plaintiffs'
counsel financing and proposing scenarios to remedy abuse).
102. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.; cf Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1995)
(explaining, by contrast to class actions, that an objector to a shareholder settlement need
only appear at the settlement hearing and raise objections to preserve the right to appeal).
106. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310.
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positions, because the named plaintiff and his or her counsel present a
unified, but not necessarily representative, front, contributes to a weak-
ening of the adversarial process. ' 7 Consequently, the role of the objector
is paramount to the creation and implementation of a fair settlement that
is in the interests of the corporation and its owners, the shareholders.""
2. The Seventh Circuit View: An Emphasis on Efficiency
Early precedent in the Seventh Circuit permitted appellate review by
non-named shareholders through objection by appearance.9 For exam-
ple, Tryforos v. Icarian Development Co."° involved a complicated de-
rivative claim based on the misappropriation of corporate assets.111 In
Tryforos, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the non-named share-
holder objecting to the dismissal of the claim with prejudice for failure to
litigate had standing to appeal. "2 The lower court subjected the non-
named shareholder to numerous and complicated orders including writ-
ten objections and retaining local counsel, but nevertheless dismissed the
claim." '
The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court as to the
objector's lack of standing, and as to the court's stipulations regarding
what constituted a proper "appearance" by an objector.1 1 4 As an initial
matter, the court indicated the conclusive presumption that a share-
holder has an unquestioned interest in the dismissal, only the non-named
107. See id. The court observed that the plaintiffs' attorneys' and defendants' interests
may "coalesce." See id. This resulting "mutual indulgence" often leads to a lack of criti-
cism of the proffered settlement and, potentially, an absence of any plenary hearing on the
merits of the settlement. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1975), overruled by
Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998); Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co., 425
F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1970), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.
1998).
110. 518 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1975), overruled by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th
Cir. 1998).
111. See Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1260. The "bitter and protracted" proceedings, which
included a succession of attorneys and a 77-page pre-trial order, culminated in the district
court's dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute. See id. at 1260-62.
112. See id. at 1260, 1263.
113. See id. at 1261-62. The court's orders additionally included the shareholder sub-
jecting himself to the jurisdiction of the court, although he was in Greece at the time of the
hearing; forcing the shareholder to file a petition denying participation in pending litiga-
tion in another jurisdiction; and forcing the shareholder to provide evidence of the share-
holder's stock ownership. See id.
114. See id. at 1263-64. The court was cognizant of the trial court's concern for effi-
ciency but remained unpersuaded by the procedural arguments. See id.
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shareholder's compliance with procedure was at issue.11 Emphasizing
the notice requirement of Rule 23.1 as encouraging objections, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a non-named shareholder who appears pursuant to
this notice may appeal an adverse decision even though he has not for-
mally been made a party to the action.' 6
More recent cases in the Seventh Circuit, however, have narrowed the
availability of the right to appellate review, first in class actions,"7 then in
derivative litigation."8 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit now requires
formal intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to
preserve a non-named party's right to appeal an adverse judgment. " '
Application for appellate review brought by non-named shareholders
in Felzen v. Andreas121 provided the impetus for this reversal of prece-
dent. International price-fixing and criminal antitrust activity by the
Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) prompted the underlying liti-
gation.12' Following the well-publicized mismanagement of this corpora-
tion, shareholders filed suit in two states, which the Central District of
Illinois subsequently consolidated.'2 2 After two years of sparse discovery
and failure to litigate vigorously, plaintiffs' attorneys reached a settle-
ment with the insurance company for ADM.123 Pursuant to Rule 23.1,
115. See id. at 1263.
116. See id. at 1264. The court feared frustration of the notice requirement, which
provides that all shareholders, both named and non-named parties, must receive notice of
a proposed settlement. See id. The court recognized that notice requirements did not cre-
ate conclusively additional procedural burdens upon the lower court, as the filing of objec-
tions does not necessitate any determination as to their legal or factual sufficiency. See id.
117. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 115 F.3d 456, 457 (7th
Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997) (following the Supreme
Court's decision in Marino and reversing circuit precedent that permitted absent class
members in class actions to appeal without intervention).
118. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam).
119. See id. (declining to hear appeal as shareholder had failed to intervene); FED. R.
Civ. P. 24 (providing procedure whereby nonparties may intervene in a pending action).
120. 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Cali-
fornia Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (per curiam).
121. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at ii, 4, Felzen (No. 97-1732). The resulting
criminal fines totaled $100 million, resulting in the largest criminal antitrust fine ever im-
posed at that time. See id. Three civil antitrust lawsuits increased the total award by an-
other $90 million. See id.
122. See id. at 5. The suits alleged failure to supervise employees properly and breach
of fiduciary duties to stockholders; the suits sought recovery of $190 million. See id.
123. See id. at 6. The settlement included an $8 million fund earmarked entirely for
legal fees, despite repeated calls for serious reform and corporate governance measures
from many large institutional investors. See id. at 6-7.
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the court held a preliminary hearing and ordered proper notice of the
proposed settlement to all shareholders. 124 In response to this notice, two
non-named shareholders, the California Public Employees' Retirement
System and the Florida State Board of Administration, filed written ob-
jections and appeared at the settlement hearing.125 Despite compliance
with the court's notice, the court denied the objections and entered the
settlement order.
26
While acknowledging that the federal courts disagree about the neces-
sary procedural requirements, and despite contrary binding precedent,
the Seventh Circuit determined on appeal that permitting parties only to
appeal judgments was "well settled" law. 27 Characterizing the objectors'
arguments for appeal as unsubstantiated, Judge Easterbrook reasoned
that the Supreme Court's ruling in Marino v. Ortiz was conclusive; the
audience of the court of appeals could not be extended to those who had
failed to intervene.1m
The importance of corporate integrity and judicial efficiency were at
the heart of the court's decision.12 ' The court reasoned that the appellate
forum risked becoming an "ombudsman" of internal corporate opera-
tions should appellate review be procured so easily."" In formally over-
ruling numerous Seventh Circuit holdings, the court emphasized the
need for self-restraint to avoid "fragment[ing] the control of the class ac-
tion" and permitting the usurpation of the class representative."' De-
spite acknowledging the necessary role of objectors in monitoring deriva-
tive litigation 1 2 and the embattled status of derivative litigation generally
due to abuse by plaintiffs' counsel,'33 the court concluded that the objec-
124. See id. at 7.
125. See id. These objections focused on the lack of any material benefit for the cor-
poration from the settlement and the large attorneys fees. See id.
126. See id. at 7-8.
127. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Marino v. Ortiz,
484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. California Pub. Em-
ployees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (per curiam).
128. See id. The court reasoned that Tryforos had summarily announced that share-
holders could appeal and had relied solely on older precedent, district court opinions, and
pre-Marino rulings. See id.
129. See id. at 874-75.
130. See id. at 874. By way of example, Judge Easterbrook noted that shareholders
"have no more right to speak for the firm or control its litigation decisions than bondhold-
ers or banks or landlords," thus underscoring the attenuated nature of shareholders as
representatives of corporate interests. Id.
131. Id. at 875 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 115
F.3d 456, 457 (1997)).
132. See id. at 876.
133. See id.
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tors' failure to properly become a parties to the litigation was fatal.1 4
Following the dismissal of the appeal by the Seventh Circuit, the Su-
preme Court granted the objectors' petition for certiorari. 135 On January
20, 1999, an evenly divided Court dismissed the complaint without an
opinion, thereby upholding the Seventh Circuit's decision. 36 The Court's
affirmance of the lower court's ruling renders the circuit court split a live
controversy, continues the lack of uniformity of federal law, and avoids
clarification of the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23 and 23.1.137
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF OBJECTOR STANDING IN DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS: AN UNEVEN BALANCE OF FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY
The approaches of the Seventh and Third Circuits propose vastly dif-
ferent procedural requirements to Rule 23.1 appeals due to an emphasis
on only one factor of a two-part balancing test.13 Although both ap-
proaches consider the fairness of the settlement and judicial efficiency in
134. See id. The court recounted the notice requirements and alluded to the purpose
and goals of the procedural safeguards. See id. The court referenced significant commen-
tary, which forecast the continued weakening of the shareholder derivative suit due to dis-
proportionate attorney's fees and a general lack of efficacy. See id. Yet, procedural stric-
tures determined the result. See id.
135. See California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
136. See California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999).
The 4-4 split resulted when Justice O'Connor recused herself for undisclosed reasons. See
id.; see also Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 15, at B23. Subsequent reports indicate that
Justice O'Connor's ownership of ADM stock prompted the recusal. See David G. Savage,
Case Dismissed, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1999, at 43.
137. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (delineating the
negative consequences of the current circuit split); Shareholder Lawsuits, supra note 15, at
B23 (predicting continued ambiguity on the issue in the wake of the Supreme Court's af-
firmance); see also Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1-2, California Pub. Employees' Retire-
ment Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998) (No. 97-1732) (arguing against an intervention
requirement and asserting the interest of the SEC "in protecting investors through effec-
tive corporate governance" and the "substantial interest" of the federal government in the
procedure applicable in the class action context); Duffy, supra note 4, at 934.
138. Compare Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting the po-
tential fragmentation of control in a shareholder suit should a right of appeal be granted),
affd by an equally divided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v.
Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720, 720 (1999) (per curiam) with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d
1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1993) (granting appeal by concluding that the fairness of settlements
was of greater concern and merit than judicial economy). In another case, Gottlieb v.
Wiles, the court characterized the test which applies to appeals by non-named parties as "a
careful balancing of the need for efficiency with the need to ensure adequate protection
for the individual members of [a] class." Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1007 (10th Cir.
1993).
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the determination of a non-named party's right to appellate review, each
approach strongly favors one factor, often utilizing the same principles to
advocate contrary resolutions.'9 Unfortunately, favoring either effi-
ciency or fairness may prove detrimental to the goals of derivative litiga-
tion.
140
A. Preservation of Appeal by Appearance
The Third Circuit's analysis in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger empha-
sized fairness and only briefly mentioned aspects of efficiency which have
constituted the ratio decidendi of contrary precedent.141 In its "fairness"
analysis, the court discussed several aspects of the policy favoring flexi-
141bility of non-named party appeals in shareholder derivative litigation.
1. The Binding Effects of Judgments on Shareholders
The Bell Atlantic court declined to resolve whether different proce-
dural rules should apply to shareholder derivative and class action litiga-
tion.1 43 Instead, the court analyzed non-party shareholder appeals within
the context of representative litigation and thus included both derivative
and class action litigation in its purview.44 This broad analysis, although
grounded in the shared history of the two rules, is devoid of the specific-
ity and practical distinctions that have characterized and strengthened
139. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875 (stating that the absence of an "opt out" provision in
shareholder suits weakens the need for appellate review by non-named parties); Bell At-
lantic, 2 F.3d at 1309 (stating that the absence of an "opt out" provision in shareholder
suits supports the grant of appellate review).
140. See Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Institutional Investors in Support of Peti-
tioners at 3, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998)
(No. 97-1732) (arguing against an intervention requirement for non-named shareholders;
noting the tendency for "valid shareholder objections [to] be ignored or improperly re-
jected by district courts preoccupied with clearing crowded dockets"); Duffy, supra note 4,
at 954-55 (noting that requiring intervention to ensure judicial efficiency ignores the merits
of the settlement and results in procedural complexities).
141. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1307-10. The court quickly dismissed the significance
of precedent, insisting that whether a non-named party may appeal a settlement was "not
settled." See id. at 1307 (citing two treatises in support of this proposition).
142. See id. at 1308-10 (noting the "opt-out" distinction between class and shareholder
action, the "agency costs" of representative litigation which could preclude shareholder
policing, and the importance of a judicious settlement in the corporation's best interests).
143. See id. at 1307-08 n.4 (declining to treat Rules 23 and 23.1 litigation distinctly in
analyzing shareholder standing but citing MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which holds
that procedural principles regarding an objector's right of appeal are equally applicable in
both class action and shareholder derivative litigation).
144. See id. at 1307 & n.4, 1308-09 (discussing class action cases and shareholder de-
rivative suits in an examination of non-party appeals).
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other decisions.14 1 While the court only briefly referenced the lack of an
"opt-out" provision in shareholder suits, 146 this distinction between
shareholder and class actions merits a more fundamental consideration.
147
In Rule 23.1 litigation, non-named shareholders are bound to the dis-
position of the case despite their inability to opt-out. Consequently,
should these shareholders disagree with the settlement and yet prefer to
remain non-named parties, their options are few.14 ' As noted, in certain
jurisdictions, dissenting shareholders may present their objections by ap-
pearance and thereby benefit from the procedural checks that appellate
review affords.5 If the jurisdiction requires intervention, however,
shareholders have limited recourse."' Shareholders may engage in a
collateral attack on the settlement by alleging fraud on the part of the
named representative or they may become a named party by moving for
145. Compare id., with Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir. 1995)
(explaining the function of the opt-out procedure in class actions and in shareholder de-
rivative suits when the non-party appeals only the attorney fee award); Gottlieb v. Wiles,
11 F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 1993) (utilizing a comparative analysis of Rule 23 and 23.1
litigation to justify non-named shareholder appeals). See discussion supra Part I.C (dis-
cussing the use of a comparative analysis to determine an objector's right to appeal).
146. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1307-08 n.4 (citing lack of an opt-out provision).
147. See generally Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1011 (emphasizing that the absence of an opt-
out provision in derivative litigation necessarily results in all shareholders being "bound by
the outcome regardless of their objections").
148. See id. at 1011 (emphasizing that the absence of an opt-out provision in Rule 23.1
results in a decision binding on all shareholders "regardless of their objections"); 1 ROGER
J. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 8.22, at 127-28 (West 1998) (noting that
shareholders are bound by the final judgment in Rule 23.1 litigation); see also 1
NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 1.08, at 13-14 (acknowledging that absent class members are
considered parties to the litigation for some purposes such as a binding judgment).
149. See 10 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION §§ 25:39 to 25:40, 25:163
(1994) [hereinafter FEDERAL PROCEDURE] (listing intervention as an option for an ob-
jecting shareholder; emphasizing the right of intervention is qualified by a showing of in-
adequate representation; noting permissive intervention is dependent upon court discre-
tion); MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 8.22, at 128 (observing that a non-appearing
shareholder's remedy is to seek to set aside the settlement as fraudulent). A grant of a
motion for intervention, however, results in named party status and the complexities of
pleading requirements. See Brief for Petitioners at 34-35, California Pub. Employees' Re-
tirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998) (compiling the "legal hurdles" and "practical
disincentives" of intervention). Furthermore, the timing of such a motion may be crucial.
See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra, § 25:187 (clarifying that after the dismissal of a share-
holder suit an order denying intervention is permissive and discretionary, and conse-
quently, non-appealable).
150. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1310; supra notes 13, 109 and accompanying text.
151. See MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 8.22, at 128 (listing fraud as the only recourse
for a non-appearing shareholder; concluding that approval of a settlement by a court is
routinely "the end of the matter").
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intervention under Rule 24.152 Res judicata bars a shareholder from
maintaining a new derivative action."' Consequently, the settlement
proceeding litigates the non-named shareholder's interests, implicating
his or her right to court access, thereby limiting appellate review and po-
tentially compromising due process guarantees.'
4
2. The Non-named Shareholder as Party and the Validity of the Marino
Holding
While recognizing the Supreme Court's holding in Marino concerning
the issue of appeals by nonparties, the Bell Atlantic court narrowed
Marino by emphasizing that "the nonparty appellants in Marino were not
members of the class or derivative action."'5  Thus, the Bell Atlantic
court was free to hold that Marino does not apply to shareholders in de-
rivative actions. This limitation on the applicability of the Court's
holding in Marino is consistent with the views of both courts and com-
mentators.157 As Bell Atlantic suggests, broad applicability of the Marino
rule appears flawed for several reasons. 58
152. See id. § 8.22, at 127-28 (indicating that an objector can set aside a derivative suit
settlement reached after proper notice and court approval only by alleging fraud in a col-
lateral attack); see also FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:163, at 127-28 (dis-
cussing the option of intervention under Rule 24).
153. See MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 8.22, at 127-28.
154. See Paolini, supra note 60, at 1739 (asserting that "[t]he power to bind nonnamed
class members with a consent decree that they had no part in negotiating is at the outer
reaches of due process"); cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) ("[I]f a full and fair
trial on the merits is provided, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require a State to provide appellate review."). Thus the objectors' position sup-
ports a strong argument for the procedural protections of due process because they are
dissenting from a settlement order rather than a full adjudication on the merits. See gen-
erally id.; Paolini, supra note 60, at 1739. The Lindsey Court additionally noted that ap-
pellate review cannot be extended to some "and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to oth-
ers without violating the Equal Protection Clause." Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 77.
155. Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1308 n.6.
156. See id.
157. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 946-47 (arguing in favor of a more permissive rule than
requiring non-party intervention under Marino); Paolini, supra note 60, at 1737-38 (noting
the difficulties that would result from extending the Marino holding to include non-named
class members); see also supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text; infra note 159 and ac-
companying text.
158. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1307-08; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Califor-
nia Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998) (No. 97-1738) (em-
phasizing that the court never "suggested" that persons already "privies to the proceedings
- such as class members" need intervene prior to gaining the right to appellate review);
Duffy, supra note 4, at 946 (discussing the literal and brief holding in Marino and noting
that "several factors" argue for a more flexible rule for non-named parties); Paolini, supra
note 60, at 1737-39 (citing the application of the Marino holding in Walker v. City of Mes-
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First, to apply Marino in scenarios involving both nonparties and non-
named parties ignores the subtle, yet important, distinction between the
two statuses. '59 A nonparty is by definition a stranger to the suit who
may argue for party status based on an interest in the litigation.6 By
imposing the Marino rule on both non-named parties and nonparties, the
procedural checks implicit in appellate review are denied to non-named




Second, established caselaw and recognized judicial doctrines already
treat nonparties as parties in numerous situations.16' Further, the very
structure of the shareholder suit device recognizes non-named share-
quite, 858 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1988); asserting that the dramatic broadening of the holding
to include non-named class members who are parties to the suit resulted in unfairness to
individual litigants). But see Brief in Opposition of Respondent Archer Daniels Midland
Company at 5, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999)
(No. 97-1732) (arguing that the Marino holding a fortiori applies to shareholders as they
assert no personal claim, only the interests of the corporation remain at issue).
159. See Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1994) (declin-
ing to overrule circuit precedent allowing non-named parties to intervene by emphasizing
that Marino only considered the standing of nonparties and not "non-representative
members of a class or derivative suit"); 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 1.07 (discussing issues
raised by recognizing non-named parties as a special class of litigants). The Supreme
Court appeared troubled by the Seventh Circuit's failure to recognize this distinction. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen,
119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732). At oral argument in California Public Employees'
Retirement System v. Felzen, Marino was referred to as "a very different kind of case" in
which the white officers "were certainly not represented by the black plaintiffs who were
suing." Id. The court and counsel for ADM conceded that the objectors in Marino "were
not members of the class." Id.
160. See Hispanic Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, 806 F.2d 1147, 1152 (2d Cir.
1986) (observing the exceptions to the party-only rule, including "when the nonparty has
an interest that is affected by the trial court's judgment"), affirmed sub nom. Marino v.
Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Brief for Petitioners at 11, Felzen, (No. 97-1732) (emphasizing
that shareholders, unlike the litigants in Marino, have been invited to participate in the
settlement hearing through court notice); see also infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the de facto
party doctrine).
161. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 946; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the importance of appellate review within the American judicial system).
162. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3902.1, at 122 (stating that nonparties
are not always required to intervene formally to gain appellate review). Circumstances in
which the court consistently has granted nonparty appeals include nonparties named in
court orders, see Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 194 n.12 (3d Cir.
1990), an attorney arguing against sanctions on the attorney, not the party to the litigation,
see DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1988), and nonparty
witnesses disputing contempt orders, see United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 20-21, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (cataloging the many instances in which the case law treats
nonparties as parties for purposes of appeal); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing de facto party
doctrine).
[Vol. 48:939
The Role of the Objector
holders as parties in several instances."' For example, the court sends
notice pursuant to Rule 23.1 to all shareholders, both named and non-
named, announcing the proposed settlement and requesting their objec-
tions. '64 Consequently, it seems unclear why non-named parties are rele-
gated to a status worse than that of nonparties with attenuated interests• • 161
in the context of appellate review and intervention.
Third, if the Seventh Circuit's expansive reading of Marino is accurate,
no non-named party could appeal without intervention, even those non-
named parties who are subsequently precluded by judgment from liti-
gating their claims.' 66 The necessary consequence of this reasoning would
be the invalidation of several well-established doctrines and an infinite
number of vacated decisions. 167  Finally, the brevity of the per curiam
opinion and citation to authority explicitly providing for exceptions to
the party-only rule render the status of Marino ambiguous'
163. See 2 ARON ET AL., supra note 21, § 27:12, at 14 (noting "that the rights of non-
party shareholders in a derivative action were too important to dispense with the notice
requirement, since the failure to give notice 'strips an otherwise final judgment of its res
judicata effect"' (quoting Grima v. Applied Devices Corp., 78 F.R.D. 431, 432 (E.D.N.Y.
1978)); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 14.03, at 14-8 (discussing the preclusive
effect of judgment on non-named shareholders when the named plaintiff is an adequate
representative and all shareholders have received notice).
164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 ("The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without ... notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise ... to shareholders.").
165. See Webcor Elecs. v. Whiting, 101 F.R.D. 461, 463 (D. Del. 1984) (terming a mo-
tion of intervention by a nonparty objector a "superfluous procedural question"); 2 ARON
ET AL., supra note 21, § 28:03, at 11-13 (reasoning that in most instances, objecting non-
named class members will have appellate standing and analogizing the situation to that of
non-named shareholders who may also be granted appellate standing on timely objection
and evidence of their status as "affected part[ies]" of the proposed settlement); Duffy, su-
pra note 4, at 946 (characterizing the requirement of intervention for non-named parties as
"unwarranted").
166. See Brief for Petitioners at 11, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (describing a broad applica-
tion of Marino as "untenable").
167. See id.; see also 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3902.1, at 106, 123 n.35 (list-
ing circumstances in which nonparties are permitted to appeal, including application of the
de facto party doctrine, nonparty witnesses, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanc-
tions).
168. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (citing United States ex rel. Louisi-
ana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397 (1917), which held that a litigant "privy to the record" may have
a right to appeal, especially should that litigant have a beneficial interest in the litigation's
outcome); see id. at 402-03; Duffy, supra note 4, at 942-43 (questioning the status of Mar-
ino); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (terming the
Marino ruling a "single aside" and noting the subsequent "gloss[ing]" that has occurred in
post-Marino decisions).
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3. How Court Notice Makes the Non-Named Shareholder a Monitor of
Settlements
In response to conflicting holdings, the Bell Atlantic court noted the
"different" approach taken by some circuits.169 One such case, refer-
enced but not discussed in the Bell Atlantic opinion, provides a solid
foundation from which the propriety of appeals by non-named parties
may be argued. 170 In Cohen v. Young, 7' the Sixth Circuit emphasized the
unique role of the non-named party.7' Because the non-named party re-
ceived the court notice relaying the terms of the proffered settlement and
requesting any dissenting shareholder to "show cause," and as this notice
is akin to a summons of process, the non-named party had a right to ap-
peal.7 7 Drawing from this rationale, a subsequent case in the Sixth Cir-
cuit considered the character of court notice to determine whether a non-
named party had been sufficiently "haled" into court and thereby de-
serving of appellate review."' Despite holding that intervention is re-
quired for non-named class members to appeal, Shults v. Champion In-
ternational Corp. 75 acknowledged that while a "mere voluntary
appearance to state or file objections" could not confer standing, "a non-
named party may... have standing to appeal if the district court has oth-
erwise 'summoned' him into court.',
176
From the finding of appellate status, several additional procedural
rights were granted to the shareholder, such as discovery and presenta-
tion of oral argument. By granting procedural rights to shareholders,
the court fulfilled the nexus between the need for appellate review and
the purpose of Rule 23 notice.17' The non-named shareholder was al-
lowed to present objections and arguments on the merits of the proposed
169. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1993).
170. See id. (citing Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942)).
171. 127 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1942).
172. See id. at 724 (granting appellant the right to argue and present evidence, subject
to court control, although he was a non-named party).
173. See id.; see also Duffy, supra note 4, at 938 (recognizing that the Cohen approach
"has become the most widely accepted solution" to the problem of non-named objector
standing).
174. See Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1994) (declin-
ing appellate review to a non-named class member as the notice was not of a "mandatory
nature").
175. 35 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir. 1994).
176. Id. at 1061.
177. See Cohen, 127 F.2d at 724-25.
178. See id. (reasoning that granting a non-named party objector standing, based on
his answering the lower court's notice to show cause, fulfilled the notice requirement of
Rule 23.1).
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settlement and the court thereby received "broader information" from
which to make a more judicious decision regarding the "fairness" of the
compromise, thus fulfilling one of the goals of derivative litigation.179
Precedent to which the Third Circuit looked in deciding Bell Atlantic
recognizes the detriments of collective action to small claimants and the
corresponding effect on the terms of the proposed settlement.80 In Ace
Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co.,81 the Third Circuit reasoned that
the right to appeal without formal intervention provided the necessary
check on "agency costs," which threaten the integrity of class action and
shareholder mechanisms."2 The term, "agency costs," includes the addi-
tional expense that an individual litigant, as principal, may incur by po-
licing aspects of the settlement proposal not voluntarily communicated
by plaintiff's counsel, the agent. The Bell Atlantic court concluded that
by reducing the agency costs associated with representative litigation,
monitoring of litigation would increase correspondingly.1 8 With moni-
toring capability facilitated by the ease of appeals, the court surmised
that the fairness of settlements procured by counsel also would in-
185
crease.
179. See id. at 725.
180. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1308-09 (3d Cir. 1993) (reasoning
that the propriety of non-named shareholder appeals was implicit in the Third Circuit's
opinion in Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30,33 (3d Cir. 1971)). In
Ace, the court hypothesized the alternatives available to the small claimant who cannot
feasibly litigate as a single party. See Ace Heating & Plumbing, 453 F.2d at 33. Without
the opportunity to appeal an unfavorable settlement, the single litigant must accept either
nothing or the adverse terms of the settlement. See id.
181. 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971).
182. See id. at 32-33. Drawing from this precedent, the Third Circuit in Bell Atlantic
cited both judicial and academic authority emphasizing agency cost concerns. See Bell
Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1309.
183. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1309-10 & nn.7-9; see also Coffee, supra note 40, at 33-
48 (attributing the lack of monitoring of plaintiff's counsel to geographic dispersal, disor-
ganization, and relatively small personal economic incentive). Given the large numbers of
clients who are often neither well-situated nor adequately motivated in conjunction with
the relatively small individual claims endemic to class and derivative litigation, the cost of
monitoring the settlement outweighs any potential benefit that the individual client could
receive. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1309-10 & nn.7-9; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (ar-
guing that the monitoring system in place now does not really protect the interests of
shareholders). This problem is compounded in derivative litigation where shareholders
often first learn of the lawsuit upon receipt of the settlement notice. See Bell Atlantic, 2
F.3d at 1309-10 & n.9.
184. See Bell Atlantic, 2 F.3d at 1309-10.
185. See id.
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4. The Practical Inefficiency of Intervention
The Bell Atlantic court acknowledged the importance of shareholderS • 186
monitoring to a fair settlement, and the obstacles to this monitoring.
The court, however, failed to address in practical terms how an interven-
tion requirement would chill this essential "policing" of settlements; be-
cause intervention requirements could place an additional burden on
both the individual litigant and, potentially, the court187
The ease of intervention, especially in shareholder suits, is debatable.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, intervention in represen-
tative litigation ordinarily requires evidence of inadequate representa-
tion by the named plaintiff.9 Non-named parties, by virtue of their in-
clusion in the representative class, are considered to possess the same
general claim as the named representative; thus a trial court that accepts
a Rule 24 motion effectively must reverse its prior ruling on the ade-
quacy of representation. 9° A non-named party may also move for per-
missive intervention under Rule 24(b). 9 Permissive intervention, how-
ever, depends on the discretion of the trial court and similarly may be
defeated by evidence of adequate representation.1 92 Additionally, both
186. See id. (emphasizing the complexities for individual litigants to overcome, such as
agency costs, problems of collective action, and the informational constraints of a large
and often geographically diverse class; concluding that such obstacles to meaningful par-
ticipation outweigh procedural concerns of efficiency).
187. See Petitioner's Reply Brief to Oppositions of Archer Daniels Midland Company
and Directors of Archer Daniels Midland Company at 4, California Pub. Employees Re-
tirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998) (No. 97-1732) (specifying the "burdens of be-
coming a party in modern commercial litigation (including submission to often unlimited
depositions, compliance with Rule 26(a), and other discovery demands)").
188. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, §§ 25:39, 25:40 (giving examples that
illustrate the inherent problems in intervention); see also Paolini, supra note 60, at 1738
(discussing the difficulties attendant to intervention); cf Duffy, supra note 4, at 946 (ar-
guing that an intervention requirement is unwarranted).
189. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (providing intervention is a right where representa-
tion is inadequate); FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, §§ 25:39, 25:44 (discussing the
mechanics of intervention and the many hurdles a potential intervenor must overcome).
190. See 1 NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 1.07-08 (discussing legal rights and status of
non-named parties); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing the text of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1; noting the goal of the rules to litigate simul-
taneously similar claims). In California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Felzen, a
substantial portion of the oral argument involved the inconsistency of the operation of
Rules 23.1 and 24. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, 15-17, 38-41, Felzen (No. 97-
1732). The practical result of approval of Rule 24 motion in the context of a Rule 23.1 suit
could be the dismissal of the entire action for inadequate representation. See id. at 16.
191. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b); FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:40 (per-
mitting intervention if an applicant's claim or defense and the existing litigation have
common questions of law or fact).
192. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:40; see also Petition for a Writ of
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forms of intervention entail procedural complexities, timing concerns,
and litigation costs not associated with appearance at a settlement hear-
ing.193 For instance, any procedural defect of a Rule 24 motion will in-
validate the motion, and this denial is not appealable. 94 Consequently,
the burden of seeking intervention may be prohibitively heavy for non-
named parties.9
In response to concerns regarding the legal obstacles attendant to Rule
24 motions, courts often note the uncontroverted appealability of denials
of requests for intervention.'9 6 Nonetheless, only the intervention denial
is appealable, not the settlement litigation in which the objector wishes to
intervene.9 Further, a grant of intervention does not necessarily address
Certiorari at 13 & n.13, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (concluding that potential denial of the right
to appeal and the requirement of intervention relegate access to appellate review to the
complete discretion of the trial judge).
193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c) (requiring an applicant for intervention to serve a mo-
tion upon parties, including grounds for intervention and a proposed pleading setting forth
the claims for intervention); FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, §§ 25:44-45 (noting
that intervention complaints must be verified and must fulfill contemporaneous ownership
requirements of Rule 23.1); see also Sierra Club v. Robertson, 960 F.2d 83, 85 (8th Cir.
1992) (emphasizing the different standards of review utilized by circuits in assessing Rule
24 motions); Paolini, supra note 60, at 1733-34 & n.5 (noting that the pro se applicant for
intervention in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1988), failed to satisfy
Rule 24's timeliness requirements; citing four-pronged test utilized by federal courts to
determine whether a Rule 24 motion is timely and therefore valid for consideration); Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief to Oppositions of Archer Daniels Midland Company and Directors of
Archer Daniels Midland Company at 4, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (determining that the "costs
and burdens" of achieving party status through intervention could negatively affect the
ability of shareholders to participate).
194. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:44; see also id. § 25:41 (indicat-
ing that permissive intervenors under Rule 24(b) must satisfy jurisdictional requirements
and, consequently, a grant of intervention could destroy diversity of citizenship of the
named parties and thereby defeat federal jurisdiction).
195. See Paolini, supra note 60, at 1738 ("Intervention is made even more difficult be-
cause there is usually a presumption that a class member's interests are adequately repre-
sented."); see also FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:39 (identifying that failure
to prove inadequate representation by the plaintiff in Rule 23.1 litigation negates any right
to intervention an applicant may have possessed under Rule 24(a)); Duffy, supra note 4, at
955 (stressing the heavy burden of proving inadequate representation, which requires
proof of collusion, adverse interests, or nonfeasance).
196. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) (requiring intervention; deflecting
potential fairness criticisms by stating that the denial of an intervention motion is "of
course, appealable"). But see FEDERAL PROCEDURE, supra note 149, § 25:187 (noting
that denial of a valid intervention motion after dismissal of the derivative claim is "permis-
sive and discretionary and, thus, not appealable"); supra notes 186-194 and accompanying
text (emphasizing that only procedurally valid motions for intervention are afforded un-
controverted appealability).
197. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 954 & n.112 (recognizing initial appellate review of the
denial of intervention only; listing related complexities of intervention motions, such as
varying standards of review and timing issues); see also Kaisha v. United States Phillips
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the objector's immediate concerns. ' Although the objector becomes a
named party, the assent of the objector is not mandatory for settle-
ment.1 Rather, intervention is solely a formality to the preservation of
appellate review.2 °
Intervention also may require additional court supervision, time, and
costs, as parallel appeals of a named shareholder arguing against a set-
tlement and an objector appealing a denial of intervention may result
from a single settlement hearing."1 Such a process effectively defeats the
stated goal of judicial economy in representative litigation and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure*2Y
B. Requiring Intervention to Preserve Judicial Efficiency
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Felzen v. Andreas represents a recent
formulation of the argument against non-named shareholder appeals.
203
Similar to other decisions requiring intervention, the Seventh Circuit
opinion is founded upon concerns for judicial efficiency.204 The Seventh
Circuit addressed several components of the policy limiting appeals in
Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 34 (1993) (denying standing to petition for certiorari to a nonparty ob-
jecting to a settlement, as the nonparty was not challenging the denial of intervention;
clarifying that a litigant may seek appellate review only of the ruling denying interven-
tion).
198. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 954 (arguing that granting intervention does not help
the objector influence the settlement, but only gives him standing to appeal).
199. See Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 529 (1986) (noting that an intervenor "does not have the power to block" a settlement
because his or her assent is not a prerequisite to approval).
200. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 954 (stating that intervention only establishes standing
for appeal). In reasoning the utility of requiring intervention, the Supreme Court during
oral argument in California Public Employees' Retirement System v. Felzen acknowl-
edged that a Rule 24 motion achieved the same result as an appearance. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 42-43, California Public Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S.
Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732). The Court commented further that as the result is the same,
namely, additional review of the proffered settlement, why should the Court adopt a more
complicated mechanism stating, "why not just let sleeping dogs lie?" Id. at 43.
201. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 954; see also supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text
(discussing the procedural complexities and legal hurdles of an intervention motion to the
non-named party; alluding to the necessary additional court supervision of such motions).
202. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1751, at 8 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that representative litigation devices are designed to pre-
vent the multiplicity of actions); 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 4, § 23.02, at
23-22 (stating that representative litigation permits the joining of multiple claims involving
common questions of law and fact in a single action).
203. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam).
204. See id. at 876; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing circuits cur-
rently requiring intervention).
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derivative litigation, including the preservation of corporate integrity, the
avoidance of multiple appeals, the distinct attributes of shareholder suits,
and the limited value of monitoring.05
1. Preservation of the Integrity of the Corporate Structure
Despite the history of shareholder suits in equity, the Seventh Circuit
has downgraded the power and efficacy of the derivative device. 06 Not-
ing that the court was not an "ombudsman," the Seventh Circuit in Fel-
zen emphasized the corporation's superior interest in the pending litiga-
tion relative to that of shareholders.0 7 The court observed that a grant of
party status could create the risk of permitting any "affected" employee,
vendor, or lawyer at a future point in time to object to a settlement as
"improvident" or erroneous.28 The court's reasoning is thus premised on
equating the interests of shareholders with those of nonparties, thereby
overlooking the circumstances in which shareholders are treated as par-
ties and ignoring their status as members of the shareholder class by vir-
tue of their ownership rights. 9 In analogizing shareholders to "employ-
ees, vendors, and lawyers"-those with only contractual ties to the
corporation-the court impliedly concluded that shareholders have no
authority or interest within the judicial process1
To support this proposition, Judge Easterbrook explained the equita-
ble foundation of derivative litigation, which permits a shareholder to
redress not a personal grievance, but the more removed and esoteric
"corporate injury., 211 Yet, the Seventh Circuit's analysis ignored the de-
velopment of the derivative action as a device to remedy injury within
the distinct and unique relationship between the shareholders and the
205. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875-76.
206. See id. at 874 (holding that, contrary to previous practice, only parties may appeal
judicial decisions).
207. See id.
208. Id. The court utilized a hypothetical in which the settlement of derivative litiga-
tion involved firing the chief executive officer. See id. Under current law, the affected
employees could not appeal the settlement because they are not parties. See id. Should
non-named parties be granted this right, however, the court impliedly warns that nonpar-
ties and strangers to the suit would react to the judicial order approving such a settlement
by filing suit. See id.
209. See id. at 874. The court concluded, "[o]nly parties may appeal ... [s]o too with
shareholders who have no more right to speak" than any other nonparty with an affected
interest. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 875. The court cited several cases highlighting the nature of corporate
injury, the benefits of litigation as enuring only to the corporation, and the analogy of the
derivative action to a "qui tam action." See id.
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corporate body; a quasi-trust analogy." The structure of a derivative
suit places the shareholder in the position of representative of corporate
interests because the shareholder is an owner of the corporation. Judi-
cial recognition of abuse of the corporate form resulting from this sepa-
ration of managerial control and ownership permitted equitable reme-
dies to redress the situation and deter future misconduct.t 4 Equity
authorized the shareholder to sue on behalf of the corporation, thus ig-
noring the shareholder's lack of standing at law and recognizing the dual
functions of the derivative action to litigate claims both against the cor-
poration by the owners and by the corporation against the directors.2 5
Thereby, the role of the shareholder in the corporate structure is accen-
216tuated. In light of this equitable foundation, the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, equating shareholder interests with mere contractual interests,
appears incomplete.2 7
This analysis, favoring the corporation's interests, seeks to preserve
corporate integrity by weakening the role of the shareholder in deriva-
tive litigation.218 Denial of standing to the non-named shareholder fulfills
212. See Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 989 & n.48 (1957) (providing a detailed analysis of the nature of
the derivative suit through an analysis of the corporate form and early English caselaw).
213. See id.
214. See FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-14 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). The Cohen court discussed the rise of the corpo-
rate framework and the need to institute a device to limit abuses. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at
547-48. As directors became "vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling
other people's money," the temptation to "profit personally" occurred in an arena of little
accountability. Id.; see also Kraakman et al., supra note 8, at 1736 (noting that shareholder
suits have "corporate value" by deterring misconduct and sometimes recovering money
judgments that reimburse the cost of the suit and injury sustained); supra notes 5-6 and
accompanying text (discussing the purpose of derivative actions).
215. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454 (1881); Prunty, supra note 212, at 989
(noting that the complexities of "secondary" or derivative enforcement were absent in
early shareholder cases). According to Prunty, early cases declined such abstractions re-
garding the corporate entity. See id. Rather, courts utilized a trust theory that emphasized
both "enforceable duties and protected rights." Id. "When a shareholder sued the man-
agement he sued on a right belonging to shareholders, to enforce a duty owed to share-
holders." Id.
216. See MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 801, at 2 (recognizing that the corporation
"has life and interests distinct from those of its temporary managers;" concluding that the
shareholder device permits a shareholder to defend the corporation as "representative of
its true interests"); Prunty, supra note 212, at 989.
217. See Prunty, supra note 212, at 994 (concluding that, despite evolutions of the de-
rivative device since its early formulation and the recognition of the corporate form, both
of the concepts of the corporate entity and the breach of the shareholder trust must be
considered); supra Part I.B (discussing the role of equity in shareholder suits).
218. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
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the desire of management to centralize the settlement process and accord
more authority to parties potentially aligned with management, both of
which could increase the likelihood of reaching a collusive compromise
not fully in the shareholder's interests.219 As the named representative
and plaintiff's counsel become the sole force with which management's
counsel must contend, a quick resolution that reflects management's
view of corporate interests becomes more likely.20 Correspondingly, set-
tlement provisions that favor the plaintiff or require extensive corporate
2211governance measures and alterations in management may wane.
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam) (accentuating that "the corporation holds the legal claim"). The Sev-
enth Circuit delineated other areas in which shareholders are passive players-including
diversity determinations-and concluded by declaring that "[sihareholders have no more
the attributes of parties when managers settle derivative litigation than when managers
settle antitrust litigation." Id. at 875-76; see also Garth et al., supra note 7, at 139 (noting
the array of procedural hurdles developed in the derivative suit context to address the
concerns of corporate management, which views the derivative suit as a "major threat" to
independent corporate control). Some of the procedural hurdles noted by the commenta-
tors include the utilization of the business judgment rule and standing limitations (e.g., the
"contemporaneous ownership" rule). See id. at 139-40.
219. See Macey & Miller, supra note 183, at 46-47 (terming settlement hearings "pep
rallies jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel"; noting that objec-
tors are uncommon and often considered "rash" by trial courts anxious to settle and re-
lieve crowded dockets). As defense counsel and plaintiffs' counsel desire a quick com-
promise to the suit, both are encouraged to present the settlement's terms as fair. See id.
at 46; see also Petitioner's Reply Brief to Oppositions of Archer Daniels Midland Com-
pany and Directors of Archer Daniels Midland Company at 4, Felzen (No. 97-1732)
("[R]equiring shareholders to assume the costs and burdens of parties [through interven-
tion] will decrease the likelihood of their participation and increase the opportunities for
improper and collusive settlements to evade judicial detection.").
220. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (detailing events
culminating in a settlement agreement in Felzen, including plaintiff's counsel's concentra-
tion on reaching a compromise with the insurance company for ADM's directors). The
resulting agreement allocated funds exclusively to pay attorneys' fees with no monetary
return to the corporation for shareholders, despite a loss in value of $190 million. See id.
The settlement also failed to adopt reform measures designed to prevent future director
misconduct. See id. at 7; see also 4 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG
ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.101, at 22-405 (3d ed. 1992) (recognizing that although the de-
rivative suit litigates corporate claims, a corporation's role in settlement negotiations
should be minimal, as the suit is initiated only after directors have declined to commence
the suit; noting that "the objectivity of the directors, which is necessary to negotiate seri-
ously a fair and adequate settlement, may be open to question"); Macey & Miller, supra
note 183, at 44-45 (underscoring the plaintiff's counsel's conflict of interest in derivative
settlements as evidenced by a desire for a quick settlement under the common fund doc-
trine of attorney fee calculation, or alternatively, a delayed settlement under the lodestar
formula).
221. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 9 (discussing the settlement of derivative suits as dis-
tinctive among lawsuit settlements due to the high ratio of reported settlements that favor
the defendant; citing Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of
Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542 (1980), which
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This protection of corporate integrity could explain the conclusive ef-
222fect the Seventh Circuit gave Marino. If shareholder interests were
akin to mere contractual interests, shareholders would, out of necessity,
be required to prove a beneficial interest before they could be consid-
ered to have party status. 223 The Seventh Circuit's rejection of precedent,
which held that non-named shareholders are conclusively parties by
court order224 and by the binding effect of judgment,225 is consistent with
the minimization of the interests of the shareholder.
2. Multiplicity of Litigation
In a recitation of circuit precedent pertaining to representative litiga-
tion, the Seventh Circuit noted briefly a second rationale for the denial
of appeals absent formal intervention. 226 The court raised the potential
for objectors to "usurp" the named plaintiff's role and "fragment the
221control" of representative litigation.
Both courts and commentators have expressed concern that ineffi-
ciency and the expenditure of limited judicial resources would result if
every non-named party were permitted to appeal an adverse settle-
228
ment. The multiplicity of litigation stemming from the ease of appeal-
ability threatens the vitality and the rationale underlying the procedure
found a 20:1 ratio in favor of defendants). A study conducted by the National Economic
Research Associates (NERA) indicated the rate of settlements in shareholder suits had
grown 20% annually between 1991-1994, while the average settlement amount fell.
FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL., RECENT TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS
IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS? i-v (1995). The study also revealed that despite this
decrease in monetary awards accruing to the corporation and its shareholders, plaintiff's
counsel's fees remained constant, accounting for roughly a third of each settlement. See
id. at ii.
222. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam).
223. See Hispanic Soc'y v. New York City Police Dep't, 806 F.2d 1147, 1152 (2d Cir.
1986) amended by Marino v. Ortiz, 482 U.S. 912 (1988), affd 484 U.S. 301 (1986), United
States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397, 402 (1917) (describing the process for non-
parties to gain party status).
224. See Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942) (reasoning that a notice to
show cause grants objector standing to appeal).
225. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that non-
named shareholders are entitled to appellate review, as they remain bound to the litiga-
tion's outcome regardless of their objections).
226. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875.
227. Id.
228. See Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009 (acknowledging concerns about individual appeals);
Duffy, supra note 4, at 939 (explaining the potential for a "myriad" of suits stemming from
the settlement order).
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of rpresntatve "" "" 229of representative litigation. As representative suits were designed to
consolidate homogeneous claims for the purpose of preserving judicial
economy and limiting individual litigation costs, the prospect of "unpre-
dictable and unlimited individual actions" could eviscerate the purpose
of such litigation.
Additionally, the ease of appealability by individual objectors could
deter settlements.231 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states as a
general goal the encouragement of settlements prior to a trial on the
merits, and emphasizes the resolution of cases by settlement as specifi-call vitl t Rul 231 ..... 232
cally vital to Rule 23.1 litigation. Commentators celebrate the benefits
of settlement, such as alleviating crowded court dockets, reducing litiga-
tion costs, and refocusing corporate efforts on business rather than
pending litigation. Procedural devices that increase the likelihood of
compromise could translate into the realization of some of these benefitsS• 234
for both shareholders and the corporation. Conversely, a procedural
device that permits a lone dissenter to halt the settlement could prevent
229. See Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009.
230. Id.
231. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 951 ("[A]ny rule that restricts the ability of unnamed
class members to appeal will increase the probability that the class representatives will be
able to settle the case.").
232. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules ... shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."); FED. R. Civ. P.
16(a)(5) (citing a goal of pretrial conferences as "facilitating the settlement of the case"); 2
ARON ET AL., supra note 21, § 26:17, at 23 (recognizing in caselaw "a clear public policy
favoring and encouraging out-of-court resolution" applicable to derivative suits particu-
larly; noting that this policy creates a "restraint in the disapproval of compromise"); see
also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing encouragement of settlements in the
class action context).
233. See Macey & Miller, supra note 183, at 45 (alleging judges' interest in settlement
approvals, given their tremendous workload, despite other procedural reforms designed to
conserve judicial resources); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Con-
sent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19 (delineating the benefits of settlement, in-
cluding avoidance of legal fees, "the expenses of discovery, the expenses of waiting, and
the uncertainty of putting the matter to a court"); Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff
Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations,
84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 312 n.27 (1985) (recognizing that litigation costs include both out-
of-pocket expenses and "opportunity cost[s]," such as diversion of company time and re-
sources from profit-making ventures to supervision of the lawsuit). Other, more indirect
opportunity costs of a full trial may include loss of consumer goodwill, negative publicity,
and damage to community standing. See id. at 313.
234. See Lazos, supra note 233, at 312-16, 332 (noting the interests of class members,
the named plaintiff, and the defendant in the class action context, and concluding that the
appointment of a guardian during pretrial proceedings will encourage fair settlements
thereby benefiting all interested parties). But see infra Part III.A.1 (maintaining that set-
tlements are not conclusively beneficial).
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such benefits.235
3. Distinctions Between Shareholders and Class Members: Limiting the
Need for Appellate Review
According to the Seventh Circuit, distinctions between class actions
and derivative litigation operate as a restriction to shareholders' judicial236
access. Of principal concern to the court in Felzen was a lack of any
personal injury sustained by the shareholder class.237 The court specifi-
cally noted an "equitable argument" for granting non-named class mem-
bers appellate review due to a "real grievance," but failed to acknowl-
edge any such equitable consideration or injury in the derivative
238context. Rather, the court described the process whereby an investor
takes control of the litigation of corporate interests in decidedly attenu-
ated and limiting terms, thus distancing the shareholder's interest in the
corporation from the corporation's legal claim. 21' For example, Judge
Easterbrook separated the shareholder from the litigation by noting that,
unlike an injured class member, a shareholder cannot sustain subsequent
personal injury.2 0 Furthermore, a shareholder does not have the power
to displace the board of directors, cannot "opt out," and is not consid-
ered for diversity purposes.2 4 '
This weakening of the role of the shareholder through a comparative
analysis of Rule 23 and 23.1 litigation appears to cloak a general disfavor
235. See Rosenbaum v. MacAllister, 64 F.3d 1439, 1442 (10th Cir. 1995) (reasoning
that the ease of nonintervenor appeals could postpone benefits that the parties might have
enjoyed otherwise).
236. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam).
237. See id. (stating simply, "in a shareholders' derivative action, the individual inves-
tor is not an injured party and is not entitled to litigate").
238. See id. (noting that a derivative suit "is brought by an investor in the corpora-
tion's (not the investor's) right to recover for injury to the corporation" (emphasis added)).
239. See id. The court underscored that the corporation suffers the damages and ex-
plained that the initiation of Rule 23.1 litigation is more akin to a qui tam proceeding. See
id. The derivative suit is only a "default" mechanism, to be utilized when the directors
breach a duty, and in some jurisdictions, only after fulfilling additional procedural prereq-
uisites, such as committee investigations. See id.; see also Brief in Oppositions of Respon-
dent Archer Daniels Midland Co. at 5, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (assessing the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analysis and agreeing that, unlike ordinary class members, shareholders "assert no
personal claim, but only the interest of the corporation").
240. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875 (surmising that if investors receive new injury during
the pendancy of the litigation, this injury is only a corporate loss and the courts would pre-
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of the derivative suit.4 2 The Seventh Circuit's reliance on these distinc-
tions fails to appreciate the legislative history of both rules.243 This his-
tory evidences an identity of language and treatment between class ac-
tions and derivative suits, especially in the context of dismissal and
compromise.244  Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's concerns lay not
merely with the ability of the objector to appeal, but more fundamentallyt. 1 241
with the role of Rule 23.1 litigation in the corporate framework.
Despite the Seventh Circuit's choice to treat the two rules similarly,
the opinion's emphasis on the dichotomy between class action and
shareholder suits makes a strong argument for additional procedural
limitations on the shareholder suit.2 46 For instance, the Seventh Circuit
correctly recognizes the potential for continuing personal injury to a class
member in comparing a class litigant with a shareholder who has only a
monetary concern. 7 This analysis, however, fails to consider the sub-
stantive remedy that shareholder litigation can yield in the form of in-
creased corporate governance and declines to recognize the importance
of a careful inquiry into the fairness of a settlement.248 Instead, the court
dismisses these concerns in favor of procedural purity.249 Consequently,
the court's emphasis on form over substantive fairness evidences veiled
250
advocacy for greater corporate control of the shareholder device.
4. The Decreased Role of Monitoring
The Seventh Circuit in Felzen admitted the important role of moni-
toring within the settlement process, noting that intervention "could be
242. See id. at 874-76.
243. See Brief for Petitioners at 30, Felzen (No. 97-1732); see also supra Part I.C.2
(analyzing the interaction between Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1).
244. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1 (same in substance); see also Brief for Petitioners at 30, Felzen (No. 97-1732)
(concluding that Rules 23 and 23.1 were not divided for the purpose of according inferior
rights to objecting shareholders versus objecting class members).
245. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875-76.
246. See id. at 875-76.
247. See id. at 875. Despite the Seventh Circuit's quick dismissal of direct injury to
shareholders, the opinion later argues in the context of standing that "reduction in the
market price of one's stock is injury." Id. at 876.
248. See id. at 876 (noting the usefulness of monitoring, the goals of Rule 23.1 notice,
and the potential for unfair settlements, but declining any in-depth consideration of these
issues due to the objector's failure to become a party).
249. See id.
250. Seeid. at 876.
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justified" where a named plaintiff lacked faithfulness."' The court, how-
ever, declined to weigh these fairness concerns equally with the court's
desire for proper procedure and efficiency."' For the Seventh Circuit,
procedure was of preeminent importance, and the non-named party's
failure to intervene precluded the court from considering the merits of
the case.253
The court's concern for formalities further obscures the nexus between
fairness and proper procedure. 254 Although the court considered the po-
tential for abuse by plaintiffs' counsel, and the resulting damage to the
vitality of derivative litigation, the court never addressed how procedure
could serve the interests of fairness.255 As the dissenting non-named par-
ties objected to the very abuse and inequity that proper procedure was
designed to ameliorate, the court's concern that monitoring would not
support and strengthen shareholder participation appears unfounded.256
III. EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS: PROVIDING THE PROPER BALANCE
AND FULFILLING THE GOALS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Resolution of the current circuit split will have significant conse-
quences for the vitality of shareholder derivative litigation.2 ' An analysis
of the current approaches to the issue reveals an emphasis on only one
aspect of what should be a two-pronged inquiry that considers both fair-
251. Id. (citing many commentators who have argued that derivative actions do not
promote beneficial corporate governance principles due to the abuses by plaintiffs' coun-
sel and the diversion of corporate resources from business to litigation).
252. See id. (recognizing the objectors' concerns about a potentially unjust settlement,
yet declining to consider the terms of the settlement and admonishing the objectors for
their failure to become proper parties by stating that "the possibility that a district court's
judgment is erroneous does not dispense with the need for an appeal by a party").
253. See id.
254. See id.; see also Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724-25 (6th Cir. 1942) (providing
procedural rights to a shareholder called by the court to present objections, and linking
these rights with the purpose of court notice and the need for "broader information").
255. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 876.
256. See id.
257. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, California Pub. Employees' Retirement
Sys. v Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998) (No. 97-1732) (per curiam) (noting that the current lack
of uniformity in federal law creates practical procedural ambiguities for the named plain-
tiff, invites forum shopping, and confuses objecting shareholders to whom procedure ap-
plies); see also FERRARA ET AL., supra note 18, § 1.03, at 1-13 to 1-20 (acknowledging that
despite reform movements directed toward Rule 23.1, and predictions of the Rule's de-
mise, the Rule remains resilient); Dykstra, supra note 6, at 74-75 (arguing, in the wake of
significant numbers of strike suits and calls for reform, that the shareholder suit continues
to flourish because of the elemental role such litigation plays in the contemporary econ-
omy).
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ness of settlements and judicial economy. An approach that considers
fairness and efficiency equally will better serve the goals of Rule 23.1 in
particular and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general.9  In light
of these considerations and the structure of Rule 23.1, the procedure that
most adequately satisfies both of these principles is appearance by the
non-named party at the settlement hearing.
260
A. Appearance Fulfills the Goals of Shareholder Litigation
1. Efficiency
An intervention requirement could create parallel appeals from a sin-
gle settlement order.26' Therefore, that procedure may place additional
burdens on the individual litigant, especially in terms of litigation costs,
while providing no reciprocal benefit of increased efficiency.262 An ap-
pearance requirement, by contrast, allows the court to consolidate in one
judicial hearing its determinations regarding the merits of the settlement
258. Compare, e.g., Brief for the United States and the SEC as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 6, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (alleging error in the Seventh Circuit's for-
mulation due to singular reliance on procedural strictures at the expense of absent share-
holder interests), with Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 12, 16, Felzen (No. 97-1732)
(chastising the Third Circuit approach for its failure to heed precedent and procedure;
terming the arguments against the Seventh Circuit view mere "policy"); see also supra
notes 12-15 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split).
259. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (emphasizing
derivative litigation's purposes are to redress wrongs in corporate management and em-
power the shareholder to commence an action for judicial relief); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11
F.3d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting the goals of representative litigation, including
uniform resolution of similar claims); Dykstra, supra note 6, at 101 (concluding that any
reform of shareholder litigation must strike a careful balance "between an overly restric-
tive approach which discourages and hampers corporate policing by shareholders, and a
too generous approach which encourages nuisance actions").
260. See 2 ARON ET AL., supra note 21, § 27:12, at 14 (setting forth the goals of notice
under Rule 23.1 as prevention of collusive settlements and the preservation of claims by
those other than the named plaintiff); MAGNUSON, supra note 148, § 8.22, at 127-129, 131
n.16 (noting that the requirement of court approval of any compromise under Rule 23.1 is
designed to ensure settlement fairness while also empowering district courts to judiciously
resolve litigation); Duffy, supra note 4, at 951-52 (concluding that a requirement of ap-
pearance fulfills the goal of meaningful participation by shareholders in the settlement
process without comprising concerns for judicial efficiency).
261. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (raising the potential for parallel ap-
peals resulting from mandatory intervention requirement).
262. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Felzen (No. 97-1732) (noting the costs
and inconveniences associated with both intervention and party status, including discovery
obligations); see also supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the practical inefficiency of interven-
tion); supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of representative
litigation to permit the adjudication of small claims which otherwise would remain unliti-
gated due to prohibitive court costs).
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and whether access to appellate review should be granted."' Providing
this one locus for both determinations keeps all named parties apprised
of the objections to the settlement.2  Thus, appearance would bring
"broader information" to the court's attention efficiently through a pro-
cedure that is accessible to sophisticated and unsophisticated non-named
parties alike .
Concerns regarding the potential decrease in settlements resulting
from eased appellate review for nonparties may be addressed by innova-
tive mechanisms, such as the appointment of guardians ad litem.2 6  Also,
increased shareholder participation may result in an increased number of
settlements, so long as the involvement is controlled, as access to all rele-
vant information in a given case may speed a resolution.267
Conversely, commentators have maintained that settlements are not
2661always in the best interests of all parties. In addition to concerns for
263. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 948, 952-53 (arguing that appearance would eliminate
the procedural pitfall of a litigant being denied access because he appealed the settle-
ment's merits instead of the intervention denial; also, it would economize the process).
264. See id. at 948, 951-53 (predicting that separating the determination of party
standing and the settlement's merits could create a breakdown in communication between
the original named parties and the objecting nonparties, thereby preventing an informed
evaluation of the settlement). If a non-named party objects to the settlement outside of
the settlement hearing, the named plaintiff may be unaware of the existence of an objec-
tion to the settlement and its basis. See id. at 953. Consequently, the named plaintiff
would be inadequately informed and may no longer be an adequate representative pursu-
ant to Rule 23.1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
265. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasizing
the potential for high "agency costs" associated with shareholder litigation and the con-
comitant importance of receiving additional information regarding the settlement's merits;
granting objector standing without intervention); Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725 (6th
Cir. 1942) (granting objector standing in anticipation of receipt of broader information
and a more just settlement); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Felzen (No. 97-1732).
The appearance requirement permits both pro se litigants and those able to secure counsel
the opportunity to present objections in court, thus improving fairness. See, e.g., Walker v.
Mesquite, 858 F.2d 1,071, 1073-74 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying objector standing to pro se liti-
gants due to their failure to comply with procedural requirements for Rule 24 motions).
Under this model a non-named party could appear in person at the settlement hearing,
send written objections, or appear by counsel. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
266. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the appointment of a guardian ad litem during
pre-appellate negotiations).
267. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 956.
268. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
(asserting that despite encouragement of pretrial resolutions provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, settlements often involve coerced consent, unequal bargaining
power, and the capitulation to forces beyond justice). The lack of authoritative consent is
especially prevalent in representative litigation where a self-appointed representative
speaks on behalf of an entire, yet often disconnected, class. See id. at 1079. One such ex-
ample of coerced consent is Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965), a case in which a
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the substantive fairness of an agreement's terms, settlement may prevent
a full and public adjudication of the merits of a particular issue.2 9 By
providing judicial interpretations of significant legal issues, adjudications
often establish clear legal principles and precedent from which the public
and courts may benefit.2 70 A lack of authoritative interpretation may be
especially acute in the context of shareholder derivative litigation."'
Nonetheless, predictions of numerous appeals resulting from the con-
ferral of appellate standing on non-named shareholders may be over-
stated, especially in light of the nominal, pro-rata recovery afforded
shareholders.2 72 Additionally, there exists a limited time frame in which a
genuinely interested shareholder can formulate objections and make a
proper court appearance, as a non-named shareholder generally learns of
271
the litigation upon receipt of court notice announcing a settlement.
Although increased appellate review may not eradicate completely
concerns for the integrity of the corporate form, decisions from states
with a long tradition of expertise in corporate law, such as Delaware and
274New York, favor non-named shareholder appeals without intervention.
2. Fairness
An appearance requirement may result in increased shareholder par-
chief executive officer privately settled a suit with the named shareholder to preclude dis-
closure of management misconduct that would have been in the interest of shareholders.
See id. at 995, 997; Fiss, supra, at 1078 & n.16.
269. See Fiss, supra note 268, at 1085-87.
270. See id. at 1085 (contending that settlement eviscerates the opportunity for an
authoritative interpretation of the law and justice is thereby left undone); Roberta Ro-
mano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 55, 85 (1991) (emphasizing that precedent creates a social benefit and
serves as a tool of corporate governance; terming legal rules and interpretations of proper
corporate conduct that result from such adjudication "public goods").
271. See Jeffrey A. Sanborn, Note, The Rise of "Shareholder Derivative Arbitration" in
Public Corporations: In Re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 337, 339 (1996) (recognizing that although judicial opinions may be pub-
lic goods, "only a limited amount of legal precedent actually results from derivative litiga-
tion because the vast majority of derivative actions are settled").
272. See Brief for Petitioners at 35, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Fel-
zen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732) (per curiam). At oral argument in the Supreme
Court, counsel for California Public Employees' Retirement System noted that, despite
the dire predictions of numerous shareholder appeals, a mere twenty-five appeals have
occurred in as many years. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Felzen (No. 97-1732).
273. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993).
274. See Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 926 (Del. 1994) (permitting non-named
shareholder appeals); Posen v. Cowdin, 44 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943)
(same). Additionally, this flexibility of appellate review exists in the partnership context.
See ICSC Partners, L.P. v. Kenwood Plaza L.P., 688 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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ticipation and monitoring.275 This access to additional information from
the entire class of shareholders will create more judicious settlements by
providing a necessary check on plaintiff's counsel, who may be motivated
.• 271
to settle quickly and exclusively for monetary compensation. Conse-
quently, an appearance requirement promotes fairness, which is the pur-
pose of including notice and court approval in Rule 23.1.277
The appearance requirement also satisfies potential due process con-
cerns by recognizing that the corporate rights of non-named shareholders
are necessarily adjudicated through the settlement approval process.
Due process in the context of representative litigation has been defined
as the adoption of procedures that "fairly insure[] the protection of the
interests of absent parties who are . . . bound by [the judgment]., 279 The
right to object, conveyed to all shareholders by court notice, affirms the
shareholders' interest in the resolution. 280 The right to appeal this resolu-
tion, should it be unsatisfactory, is implicit in the right to object.2'
By contrast, an intervention requirement does not presume a preex-
12isting interest on the part of the intervenor. Rather, the intervenor
must prove an interest in the litigation and the right to participate may
be conditioned entirely on judicial discretion rather than proper proce-
275. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 951-52 & n.99 (noting that non-named class members
will be more willing to present objections if they are able to appeal the settlement).
276. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1964) (detailing con-
tinued efforts of objectors in increasing settlement amount from $700,000 to $1 million and
again to $3 million).
277. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 532 n.7 (1984) (discussing the
purpose of notice and court approval as the prevention of litigation under circumstances
that "disserve the legitimate interests of the company or its shareholders"); Stepak v.
Tracinda Corp., Civil Action No. 8457, 1989 WL 100884, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1989)
(considering the settlement more critically due to the objectors' ardent opposition to the
terms of the profered settlement and concluding that the terms were neither fair nor rea-
sonable).
278. See Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing the bind-
ing effect of judgments in shareholder actions as a rationale for granting objector standing
without formal intervention); Paolini, supra note 60, at 1739 (recognizing the binding ef-
fect of a consent decree in the class action context; noting that a lack of non-named class
member negotiation could touch upon the "outer reaches of due process" and calling for
stringent procedural protections to redress this potential constitutional violation).
279. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
280. See Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942); see also Marshall v. Holi-
day Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977) (granting standing to non-named class
members as their rights were being adjudicated in the lawsuit).
281. See Brief for Petitioners at 2, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Fel-
zen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732) (per curiam) (concluding that the right to appeal is
a "necessary component" of the right to object).
282. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of inter-
vention).
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3. Equitable Considerations
Judicial and academic treatment of the issue of shareholder standing
frequently recognizes the equitable foundation of the derivative suit.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, utilized equity to minimize the role of the
shareholder within the derivative suit structure.28 Yet, the Seventh Cir-
cuit failed to consider other distinct attributes of equity jurisdiction that
militate for an appearance requirement.
First, there exists no historical analogue to an intervention require-
ment in representative litigation.Y Rather, equity consistently favored
the liberality of appeals in the representative context.8 For instance,
equity recognized nonparty interests by applying the quasi-party doctrine
that granted specific rights of participation to nonparties on appeal2 8 In
the derivative context, the quasi-party doctrine could expressly grant to
the non-named shareholders the right of settlement approval8 9
Second, equity jurisdiction is highly fact-specific and grants substantial
discretion to judges in reviewing particular facts.290 This careful scrutiny
of the specific attributes of each case, and the weighing of equities in re-
sponse to particular circumstances, requires access to all relevant infor-
283. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text (discussing the mechanics of inter-
vention).
284. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam); Duffy, supra note 4, at 940-42.
285. See Felzen, 134 F.3d at 875 (discussing equitable considerations in shareholder
derivative and class actions); see also supra Part I.B (discussing the development of the
derivative action).
286. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 940, 943 (stating that intervention has no historical
foundation and arguing that a doctrine requiring intervention "rests on a clumsily rea-
soned line of inferences and unsubstantiated conclusions").
287. See id. at 940-41 (asserting that appeals in a class action context should be granted
freely pursuant to equitable tradition; citing early British authority as representing "a
long-standing appreciation of access to appellate review by persons whose rights and du-
ties are being determined by the courts").
288. See Brief for the United States Government and SEC as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 12, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (No. 97-1732) (citing cases in which the Supreme Court recognized the quasi-party
doctrine).
289. See id. at 12-13; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring notice and court ap-
proval).
290. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch.
1996) (emphasizing the crucial role of a fact intensive evaluation to promote fairness in a
derivative settlement, especially because the settlement process engenders an "absence of
a truly adversarial process ... and legally assisted objectors are rare").
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mation, which only flexible appeals can afford. 1
B. Recommendations for Procedural Mechanisms to Ensure the Efficacy
of an Appearance Requirement
Although there are many benefits to an appearance requirement, con-
cern for judicial efficiency and the integrity of the corporate structure in
the wake of increased flexibility of non-named shareholder appeals are
12valid. In response to these concerns, several procedural mechanisms
could be utilized to preserve the goals of Rule 23.1 litigation while
granting non-named shareholders appellate review under decreased con-
straints.
1. The De Facto Party Doctrine
Despite formal intervention, under the de facto party doctrine, courts
permit appeals by nonparties who participate in court proceedings as if
they were parties. Although no definitive lines establish what level of
participation will suffice, courts apply a three-part test.29 This test con-
siders the nonparties' participation in the lower court proceedings,
whether the equities weigh in favor of hearing an appeal, and the per-
sonal stake of the nonparties in the litigation's outcome. 29'
291. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 940, 955-56.
292. See Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1998), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720
(1999) (per curiam) (noting concern regarding the fragmentation of representative litiga-
tion); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that allowing individ-
ual appeals risks the evisceration of the utility of representative litigation); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 1993) (asserting the potential for unwieldy liti-
gation and the defeat of the goals of representative litigation as reason to deny standing to
appeal to nonparties). At oral argument in Felzen, Justice Scalia analogized the prospect
of successive appeals pertaining to one settlement as "a perpetual motion machine."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Felzen (No. 97-1732).
293. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 3902.1, at 102, 106 (discussing the appli-
cation of de facto party status in situations where persons participate in trial proceedings
as if they intervened).
294. See id. Compare Curtis v. City of Des Moines, 995 F.2d 125, 128 (8th Cir. 1993)
(granting standing to appeal and accepting briefs due to the party's active participation
through court appearance), with EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Servs., 47 F.3d
1438, 1442-43 (5th Cir. 1995) (denying standing to appeal for failure of the nonparty to
plead, intervene, or participate; noting nonparty's adequate representation by class repre-
sentative).
295. See, e.g., Louisiana Office of Community Servs., 47 F.3d at 1442 (delineating the
de facto party test); SEC v. Wencke, 783 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). An analo-
gous doctrine was advanced by counsel at oral argument in California Public Employees'
Retirement System v. Felzen. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-6, Felzen (No. 97-
1732). Under the quasi-party doctrine, a person will be granted the right of appellate re-
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In the context of Rule 23.1 litigation and to prevent the possibility of
multiple appeals, this test could be applied to requests for appellate re-
view by objecting non-named shareholders.96 Such a test would be con-
sistent with the equitable foundation of Rule 23.1 and would ensure that
those granted the right of appeal have evidenced meaningful participa-
tion and interest in the litigation.297 The test would provide a check on
the number of appeals granted by considering the extent of a non-named
party's interest, and may therefore alleviate concerns regarding corpo-
rate integrity.9
In determining the extent of a non-named party's interest in the litiga-
tion, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act)
offers guidance.299 The Reform Act seeks to deter abuse by class action
attorneys by giving control of the litigation to a "most adequate plain-
tiff."3°°  The Reform Act includes a rebuttable presumption that the
plaintiff with the greatest financial interest is the "most adequate plain-
tiff."
301
view when they have been sufficiently summoned to court, have appeared and litigated
their claim, and will suffer preclusion of their claim from the judgment. See Brief for the
United States Government and SEC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Califor-
nia Public Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999) (No. 97-1732) (cit-
ing cases in which the Supreme Court recognized the quasi-party doctrine). The doctrine
has been utilized primarily in receivorship and real property situations; however, the three
requirements could translate to the shareholder derivative context. See id. at 5, 9-14. The
requirements are consistent with the purposes of Rule 23.1, could alleviate efficiency con-
cerns, and recognize due process concerns. See id.; see also supra notes 278-81, infra note
297 and accompanying text.
296. See Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1009 (recognizing potential for numerous appeals should
requirements of appellate review be relaxed). Courts already had utilized these factors to
some extent in previous rulings. See Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942)
(granting appellate standing to an objecting non-named shareholder because court notice
requesting him to show cause was akin to a summons); cf. Gottlieb, 11 F.3d at 1011 (distin-
guishing, in dicta, Rule 23.1 actions by noting the concerns that all shareholders remain
bound by judgment).
297. See Duffy, supra note 4, at 956 (observing the importance of meaningful involve-
ment to the fair resolution of derivative litigation).
298. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (discussing the interests of corpo-
rate management in a centralized settlement process).
299. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (West 1997). The Reform Act, promulgated in response
to abuse in private securities class actions, instituted numerous reforms. See S. Rep. No.
104-98 at 4 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683. These reforms intended to dis-
courage frivolous suits and excessive attorneys' fees while encouraging meritorious share-
holder claims and voluntary corporate disclosure. See id.
300. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4 (a)(3)(B)(i). This "most adequate plain-
tiff" would serve as the lead plaintiff. See id.
301. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4 (a)(3)(B)(i) & (3)(B)(iii)(bb). The Re-
form Act intended to align the lead plaintiff with the interests of the class of shareholders
and thereby avoid both professional plaintiffs and suits motivated solely for recovery of
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Although a facile determination of interest by numerical and monetary
calculation is questionable, the Reform Act serves as precedent to aid
courts in deciding what constitutes a sufficient personal interest under
the de facto party test.3°2
2. Requiring Appearance at the Settlement Hearing and Narrowly
Tailoring the Court Order Granting Appellate Review
Concerns regarding the multiplicity of appeals could be alleviated by
requiring that a non-named shareholder present objections, either in per-
son or in writing, solely in the confines of the settlement hearing.03 Lim-
iting objections to this single forum is consistent with the goals of Rule
23.1, which provides for participation by requiring court approval and
notice. '0 An ancillary benefit of limiting appeals exclusively to share-
holders who demonstrate diligence in court attendance or proper sub-
mission of objections may be a decrease in the number of appeals and
the grant of court audience to persons genuinely interested in the litiga-
tion's resolution.
Further, the potential whirlwind of motions and discovery resulting
from this provision of appellate standing could be abated through the use
of a narrowly tailored court order.' 6 In addition to limiting discovery
solely to the merits of the settlement, the court could delineate a sched-
ule of proceedings and retain its jurisdiction to ensure proper compli-
attorneys' fees. See S. Rep. No. 104-98 at 10-11 (1995) reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
683. In deciding that this lead plaintiff would be selected on the basis of financial stake,
Congress demonstrated confidence in institutional investors and recognition of the fiduci-
ary obligations between instituional investors and their shareholders. See id. Emphasizing
the ability of institutional investors to supervise settlement negotiations and assess the
fairness of the compromise, Congress predicted that "the increasing role of institutional
investors in class action will ultimately benefit the class and assist the courts." Id. at 11.
302. See In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. Civ. A. 96-0633, 1998 WL 470160, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 12, 1998) (discussing appointment of lead plaintiff and rebuttable presumption
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
303. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text (recommending the centralization
of all objections to the settlement hearing). See generally Duffy, supra note 4, at 951 (rec-
ognizing that a class representative under this model need only be concerned with objec-
tions raised at the settlement hearing, rather than post-settlement hearing objections).
304. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (outlining the goals of notice and court
approval).
305. Cf. Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1971)
(suggesting in dicta that, if shareholders could choose to appeal after seeing the settle-
ment, many of them probably would choose not to do so).
306. See Saylor v. Bastedo, 78 F.R.D. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting a nonparty
objector status, thus affording him an adequate opportunity for discovery, but limiting this
right to the "facts going to the propriety of the settlement") (internal quotes omitted)).
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ance.07 A narrowly tailored order would be consistent with equity and
the asserted interests of the shareholders in arguing exclusively the mer-
its of the settlement, while conserving limited judicial resources.3 8
3. Appointment of a Post- Trial Guardian
Corporate management has lauded procedural devices that afford pro-
tection to corporate integrity and an opportunity for the corporation to
"vindicate its own rights."3°9 These devices include the requirement of
making a demand prior to commencing a derivative action, the applica-
tion of the business judgment rule, and the utilization of special litigation
committees comprised of disinterested directors. 1°  Similar to these
mechanisms, the court could appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
interests of the shareholders during the settlement process and prior to
appellate review." Commentators have noted that this procedure would
provide representation for absent members and avoid settlements overly
favorable to plaintiffs' counsel, yet encourage a quick resolution by
312
streamlining the receipt of information and emphasizing negotiation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In consideration of the fairness and efficiency principles underlying
307. See id. (limiting discovery to a six-month period, encouraging all objectors to par-
ticipate in this discovery, and scheduling a settlement hearing to assess newly obtained
evidence). Such judicial expression may be authorized by the court's inherent power as
specifically referenced in the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendments to Rule
23.1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee's note ("The court has inherent power
to provide for the conduct of the proceedings in a derivative action ....").
308. See Brief for the United States and the SEC as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 27, California Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Felzen, 119 S. Ct. 720 (1999)
(No. 97-1732) (per curiam) (arguing for an appearance-only requirement in shareholder
suits by analogizing the equitable doctrine of quasi-parties, which provides for non-party
appeals but limits participation to that party's cognizable interest). From this analysis the
SEC concludes that "[a]n unfettered, though narrowly tailored, right to appeal the district
court's decision ... will further the purposes underlying Rule 23.1 by ensuring the oppor-
tunity for appellate scrutiny." Id.
309. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); see also Garth et
al., supra note 7, at 139 (discussing procedural hurdles to shareholder litigation designed to
provide corporate management with increased control).
310. See Garth et al., supra note 7, at 139-41.
311. See Macey & Miller, supra note 183, at 47 (suggesting the institution of guardians
ad litem as a possible reform and emphasizing the guardian's neutral role in assessing a
settlement because he would object for absent members unless a clear statement of the
settlement's fairness was provided).
312. See id. at 47-48 (suggesting that the guardian's mere "presence in the litigation"
would encourage fairness to the absent shareholders, especially if there were economic
incentives); Lazos, supra note 233, at 309-11 (advocating appointment of a guardian).
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Rule 23.1, placing unnecessary procedural requirements on the individ-
ual non-named shareholder seeking appellate review is problematic. Ful-
fillment of these dual principles can be achieved by requiring an appear-
ance by the non-named shareholder within the confines of the settlement
hearing to preserve the right to appellate scrutiny. The appearance re-
quirement avoids unnecessary litigation costs, preserves the judiciary's
limited resources, and ensures access to all relevant information needed
to formulate a fair and judicious settlement. Concerns regarding multi-
ple appeals and threats to corporate integrity can be mollified substan-
tially by utilizing various procedural mechanisms. Although these
mechanisms serve to limit the number of non-named shareholders to
whom appellate review may be accorded, these procedural devices em-
phasize equity and propriety in tandem with judicial economy.
